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Chapter 1
Introduction
Informality, often referred to as the informal sector, is crudely defined as all un-
registered economic activity. To be a bit more specific it may be defined as the
value-added from all unobserved economic activity that is not included in the
calculation of the gross domestic product (GDP). This definition captures the
production of households, self-employed and unregistered small-scale enterprises
that create value added to the economy. In developing countries this phenomenon
makes up a large part of the overall economy; by some estimates it accounts for
30 to 60 percent of the official GDP1, while as much as over 70-80 percent of the
labour force is characterized as informal in the most extreme cases. There is no
evidence that this phenomenon is on the retreat; most experts seem to believe that
the numbers have increased recently (see figures 1.1 and 1.2).
Considering that informality is such a large part of economic life, especially in
developing countries, we are curious to find out if it has any effect on the economic
development of nations. Since the most commonly used measure of economic
development is the growth rate of national income, we analyze the relationship
between the magnitude of the informal sector and GDP growth. We use estimates
of the size of the informal sector that is provided by Schneider (2005). These
estimates are made using a structural equation model called the dynamic multiple
1These are estimates of the shadow economy. See section 3.3.1.
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Figure 1.1: Non-agricultural informal employment.
Observations in percent of non-agricultural employment. Source: ILO (2002).
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Figure 1.2: Size of the informal sector in the 1990’s.
In percent of official GDP. Source: Schneider (2005).
5indicators multiple causes (DYMIMIC) model, and they are expressed as the size
of the informal sector as a share of GDP.
The analysis is based on entering the estimated relative size of the informal sector
into an empirical growth model, where the real GDP per capita growth rate is the
dependent variable. We then run random and fixed effects regressions on growth
for 109 countries from all regions of the world over three periods in the last decade,
in 1990-91, 1994-95 and 1999-2000. All data transformations and regressions are
performed using Stata Intercooled 9.0.
We find that the size of the informal sector has a negative effect on GDP growth in
developing countries. Increasing the size of the informal sector with one percentage
point to GDP leads to 0.42 percentage points decline in GDP growth. The results
for developed economies and economies in transition from a formerly planned
economy are less clear, indicating a small positive effect of increasing the informal
sector. The latter result is not significant at conventional levels of confidence.
Before we take on the empirical analysis we will discuss important features of
informality. First we will address the question of what informality actually is. In-
formality is associated with many economic activities and the issue of how to define
informality is still unresolved. Thus we will discuss some different approaches that
have been made to define informality.
A central part of this treatment discusses the causes and consequences of infor-
mality. An important aspect is the effect of an increasing informal sector. We also
discuss different hypotheses on the effects of informality on growth.
Another important issue for most economists in this field of research is the pursuit
of a method to measure the “size” of the hidden and unobserved informal sector.
We will discuss several different methods that has been developed to measure
informality, with emphasis on the multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC)
model that is the most modern approach to measure the relative size of the informal
sector.
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The outline of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 provides a background discussion
of different aspects of informality and the history of the concept informal sector.
In chapter 3 we discuss various definitions of informality and try to clarify what
informality really is. In particular, we shall describe how the informal sector is
defined since this will provide the underlying assumptions for our framework of
analysis in the subsequent empirical treatment. In chapter 4 we will discuss the
causes and consequences of informality, the effects of increasing informality and the
relationship between the informality and development. Chapter 5 gives a survey of
methods that may be used to estimate the size of the informal sector. In chapter
6 we consider some important empirical studies, in particular the study made by
Schneider (2005) will provide a backdrop for our own empirical study made in
chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Types of informality
Palmade & Anayiotos (2005) takes on a generally negative view of informality
and describes four main types: Labour informality, product informality and land
informality and tax evasion.
Regarding the labour informality, few social rights, no social security, minimum
wage and little vocational training leaves the informal enterprises (and the overall
economy) in an informality trap of low productivity. This is actually ensured by
labour regulations intended to protect workers that makes it cumbersome for firms
to hire workers formally. Product informality is characterized by stringent product
market regulations such as quality standards which leads firms to produce informal
goods. This gives the informal firms a competitive advantage such that more
productive firms are squeezed out. Poor enforcement of intellectual property rights
and trade barriers are other sources of product informality. Land informality are
caused by cumbersome government registration processes, government ownership
of land and low property taxes. Subsidies of utility (livestock) prices make it even
more difficult to develop land. This means high social costs in terms of extended
urban slums (the lack of formally developed land accounts for nearly half of the
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population living in slums in the developing world), and economic costs in terms
of no mortgage-backed financing for firms operating on informal land. Just as
in the case of product informality tax evasion creates competitive advantages for
informal enterprises as opposed to formal (and more productive) companies. Since
informality takes away the advantage of formal productivity, more firms become
informal and the government has to increase the tax rate due to the reduced tax
base. This increases the incentives for firms to go informal even more, thus creating
a vicious cycle.
There are several other types of informality; for instance, the informal water supply
is the only source of water for many of the poor people in the least developed
parts of the world. Informal housing is another important activity that provides
services that governments in developing regions are unable to provide due to the
increasing urban migration. In a discussion of the contribution of the informal
sector Lubell (1991) states that “[t]he economic contribution of informal sector
housing is enormous, its contribution to human welfare incalculable.” Hence, it
is important to emphasize that informality contributes positively as well. For
many workers and enterprises, the informal sector allows for greater flexibility
and mobility than the formal sector and it is more able to absorb excess supply
of labour. In developing countries it is also known for providing subsistence, a
feature of informality that is sometimes forgotten when people discuss the effects
of informality. It may thus be argued that informality also contributes positively
to development.
There are many kinds of different activities that are associated with informality
and to the informal sector. Djankov et al. (2002) provides a useful categorization
of such informal activities based on the degree of informality in the enterprises
that operate in the formal and informal sector (see table 2.1). Notice the implicit
assumption that all enterprises place themselves somewhere on the “spectrum of
business activity, ranging from informal to formal”; this conveys the notion that it
is difficult, if not impossible to categorize the economy into two separate entities,
the formal and informal sector.
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Informal sector Formal sector
Subsistence
enterprises
Unofficial
enterprises
Unofficial
enterprises
Official
enterprises
Degree of in-
formality
100% High propor-
tion of sales
workers not
registered
Some proportion of sales unde-
clared and workers unregistered
Type of ac-
tivity
Single street
traders, cot-
tage/micro
enterprises,
subsistence
farmers
Small man-
ufacturers,
service
providers,
distributors,
contractors
Small and medium manufactur-
ers, service providers, software
firms
Technology Labour
intensive
Mostly
labour inten-
sive
Knowledge and capital intensive
Owner pro-
file
Poor, low ed-
ucation, low
level of skills
Poor and
non-poor,
well edu-
cated, high
level of skills
Non-poor, highly educated, so-
phisticated level of skills
Markets Low barriers
to entry,
highly com-
petitive,
high product
homogeneity
Low bar-
riers to
entry, highly
competi-
tive, some
product dif-
ferentiation
Significant barriers to entry, es-
tablished market/product niche
Finance
needs
Working
capital
Working
capital, some
investment
capital,
supplier
credit
Investment capital, and working
capital, letters of credit, supplier
credit
Other needs Personal
insurance,
social pro-
tection
Personal
and perhaps
business
insurance
Personal and business insurance,
business development services
Source: Djankov et al. (2002).
Figure 2.1: Types of informality.
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2.2 History of the concept informal sector
One of the first to discuss the dual economy of developing countries was Boeke
(1953) who divided the economy into what he called the “firm-centred economy”
and the “bazaar-economy”. The former was characterized by an efficient conduct
of business, high productivity and capital and technology intensive production,
the latter was known for its low productivity, its labour intensity, small scale, low
income and a high capacity for absorption (Renooy 1990). This was followed by
several studies emphasizing the dual distinction between the formal economy and
the “traditional economy”. The notion of the “informal sector” was first used by
Hart (1973)1 that studied the structure of employment in Accra, Ghana. This was
used to label some part of the urban labour force that operated outside the formal
labour market, and was almost synonymous to any group that could be said to
consist of self-employed individuals, including criminal activities.
The research on the informal sector is considered to be pioneered by the Kenya
employment mission2 that was conducted by the International Labour Office in
1972. This study came much in response to former ideas on informality that
stated that it would disappear by itself as the less developed parts of the world
caught up with the developed regions. The Kenya employment mission recognized
that the traditional sector had, in fact, “not just persisted but expanded to include
profitable and efficient enterprises as well as marginal activities” (ILO 2002). Thus,
they used the term “informal sector” (from Hart (1973)) to distinguish it from
the obsolete notion of a “traditional” sector. In ILO (1972) the informal sector
was characterized by enterprises’ avoidance of government regulations and taxes,
and it was thought to provide subsistence to the poor. To mediate the negative
consequences of the informal sector one should therefore address issues of poverty
and employment relations. One important difference between the two studies of
Hart and ILO was that Hart (1973) focused on self-employed individuals, while
1Keith Hart introduced this concept first in 1971 at a conference on urban unemployment in
Africa.
2This was one of the first in a series of “employment missions” initiated by ILO.
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ILO (1972) focused on the behaviour of small-scale enterprises. The latter became
the focus of study in much of the later literature on the informal sector.
The focus on informality changed somewhat after the famous study by de Soto
(1989). This study emphasized the role of political institutions and legal structures
in the development of the informal sector; investigating how excessive regulations,
red tape and corruption (bribes) create barriers to entry into the formal sector,
thus forcing workers and enterprises into the informal sector. Entering the infor-
mal sector was not only a response to the opportunities that the informal sector
creates, but also a response to the barriers that hinder the entry into the formal
sector.
Along the way the literature on informality has been mixed with studies of more
specific phenomena, such as tax evasion and illicit work, broadening the concept
and in some cases pushing the development towards a more macro-based approach
to the study of informality. This has led to the development of macroeconomic
measurements of the size of the informal sector in terms of both the income cre-
ated and working hours supplied to the informal sector, making it possible for
economists to analyze the macroeconomic causes and consequences of the infor-
mal sector and informal activities.

Chapter 3
Defining informality
What is informality? Throughout the economic literature there exists no com-
monly accepted definition of this phenomenon. Furthermore, there is no consensus
on how to label this phenomenon. The labels includes the underground, subter-
ranean, shadow, informal, irregular, hidden, parallel, clandestine, black, second
and household (economy or sector), thus contributing to the confusion regarding
the definition of informality. These labels do in some cases refer to quite different
domains of informality and the application of these labels differs also from study
to study. It is therefore difficult to compare the literature on informality and its
different methods and empirical findings since it often depends on the problem at
hand.
There have been several different approaches to defining informality. One of them
is the approach taken by those who first studied the informal sector in develop-
ing countries. They mostly defined the informal sector as consisting of all small
enterprises. Other approaches are based on simpler phenomena (in terms of defin-
ing it) such as tax evasion and/or tax avoidance. Economists were studying the
magnitude of unreported income already in the 1950’s.1 However, this type of
informality is only a part of what may be defined as the underground or informal
economy. The broad definitions of informality consist of many different economic
1See Cagan (1958).
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activities and economic units.
The informal sector, most commonly studied in the context of developing coun-
tries, could most easily be defined by what it is not, i.e. the formal sector. But
this is considered to be too simplistic, the formal and informal sector are not inde-
pendent entities, they are deeply intertwined and interdependent. This naturally
creates much difficulty and confusion when trying to define the informal sector.
By searching for common properties of the informal sector one will often include
one too many when making such lists of properties. This is because the informal
sector consist of many phenomena, some of them working together, some not, and
this creates the utter confusion when discussing the informal sector: It is not one
single entity, not a specific group of individuals or enterprises and certainly not
some specific number.
In the following sections we shall focus on the economic criteria for defining infor-
mality. What these criteria are about should become clear as we discuss some of the
different approaches that have been made to define informality. Most importantly,
we shall discuss the definition of the shadow economy that is used by Schneider
(2005). This definition is part of the framework for our empirical investigation of
informality and development.
3.1 Criteria used to define the informal sector
In a review of the literature on the informal sector in developing and developed
countries, Gërxhani (2004) gives an account of the different criteria that has been
used to define or classify the “informal sector” in some of the most important
studies on the informal sector. These classifications are divided into three main
institutional criteria: Political, economic and social criteria. The political sub-
criteria refer to (1) government regulation, (2) illegal activities and (3) national
statistics. These are used to explain the impact of informality on politics, where
especially the extent of governmental regulation has been used to define the in-
formal sector. The economic sub-criteria are (1) the labour market or status of
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labour, (2) unreported income or tax evasion, (3) size of activity or scale of op-
eration, (4) professional status, (5) regulation or registration of activities and (6)
national statistics or GNP accounts. Here the first two criteria as well as the last
two are probably the most applied ones in the most recent literature. The size of
activity/scale of operation criteria has been employed to a larger extent in studies
of developing countries. The social criteria are (1) social networks and ease of en-
try, (2) autonomy and flexibility and (3) survival. The second criterion is probably
more important in developed countries, while the survival criterion is considered
relevant to the less developed countries only.
3.2 Informal employment and the informal econ-
omy
In an attempt to create a benchmark statistical definition of the informal sector to
reinforce the pursuit of statistics on informality, the International Conference of
Labour Statisticians ICLS adopted the following definition of the informal sector
(see figure 3.1).2
This definition was also later adopted in the revised International System of Na-
tional Accounts (1993 SNA). To comply with SNA standards, the definition was
based on production units instead of employment relations (ILO 2002). To take
the employment relations into account when speaking of informality and to im-
prove the old terminology, ILO (2002) therefore introduces3 the expanded concept
of the “informal economy”4 to “. . . incorporate in[to] this concept [i.e. the infor-
mal sector] the whole of informality - including both enterprise and employment
2This figure is found (unaltered) in ILO (2002).
3The label “informal economy” was by no means new in the literature on informality, but the
attempt to define it as an expanded concept of the informal sector is quite recent.
4Thomas (1992) argues that using the term economy is misleading since it presupposes that
it exists at a unique location (such as in a country), i.e. there cannot exist several economies at
the same place.
16 Defining informality
[. . . ]The informal sector is regarded as a group of household enterprises or unincorporated
enterprises owned by households that includes:
• informal own-account enterprises, which may employ contributing family workers and
employees on an occasional basis; and
• enterprises of informal employers, which employ one or more employees on a contin-
uous basis.
The enterprise of informal employers must fulfill one or both of the following criteria: size
of unit below a specified level of employment, and non-registration of the enterprise or
its employees. [. . . ][F]lexibility is allowed with respect to the upper limit on the size of
employment; the introduction of additional criteria such as non-registration of either the
enterprise or its employees; the inclusion or exclusion of professionals or domestic employees;
and the inclusion or exclusion of agriculture.
Figure 3.1: ICLS definition of the informal sector.
relations - as manifested in industrialized, transition and developing economies.”5
In this concept they discuss in specific what the informal economy is not, i.e. the
formal economy (in this setting the formal economy means “regular, stable and pro-
tected employment and [. . . ] legally regulated enterprises”), the criminal economy
(meaning the production and distribution of illegal goods and services, the informal
economy being characterized by production and distribution of legal goods and ser-
vices) and the reproductive and care economy (which is unpaid domestic work and
care activities; these activities does not entail any form of transactions), and what
the informal economy is, i.e. informal employment in and outside informal enter-
prises. The most pronounced difference of this way of defining informality here
compared to the 1993 ICLS definition is that the informal economy now includes
informal employment in formal (sector) enterprises. Previously, informality was
considered to be only informal (and formal6) employment in informal enterprises
since the informal sector was defined to be all informal enterprises. One other im-
portant aspect here is that the informal economy captures “all remunerative work
5The fact that ILO and others have had trouble with sticking to the 1993 ICLS definition of
the informal sector goes to show how difficult it is to define informality and apply it in research.
6This type of informality is rare and in most cases not considered.
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- both self-employed and wage work - that is not recognized, regulated or protected
by existing legal or regulatory frameworks and non-remunerative work undertaken
in an income-producing enterprise.” This concept of informality thus contradicts
earlier notions of two disjoint sectors, taking into account that most employment
relations are on a continuum between the “completely” formal relations (in terms
of labour market regulations and legal protection) and the “informal” end of the
spectrum. This is not only based on the observations of informal employment in
formal enterprises, but also the increased use of informal sub-contracting by formal
enterprises and the use of part-time and temporary employment (which is informal
in most parts of the world outside the developed community).
One way of classifying the different elements of the informal economy according
to ILO (2002) is by the types of economic units and by employment status. There
are three relevant types of economic units: Formal enterprises, informal enter-
prises and households. The different employment statuses are own-account work-
ers, employers, employees, contributing family workers and members of producers’
cooperatives. This categorization resembles the one depicted in table 2.1.
3.3 The income based unobserved sector/economy
A large part of the literature on informality defines it in conjunction with the
measured and observed economy. The informal or unobserved economy is the
part of the economy that is not captured by the measurement of e.g. the gross
domestic product (GDP). In his “Unobserved income hypothesis” (UIH), Feige
(1981) asserts that
“. . . the UIH suggests that systematic biases, unwittingly introduced
into our official data, have fundamentally distorted our perceptions
of economic realities. [. . . ] the bias introduced into our information
system is closely associated with a large and growing sector of economic
activity which has eluded governmental observation”.
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The shadow economy includes all marked-based legal production [and distribution] of goods
and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following reasons:
• to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes,
• to avoid payment of social security contributions,
• to avoid having to meet certain legal labour market standards, such as minimum
wages, maximum working hours, safety standards, etc., and
• to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing sta-
tistical questionnaires and other administrative forms.
This definition excludes the criminal sector (which is defined as the production and distri-
bution of illegal goods and services), and the household sector (all household services and
production).
Source: Schneider (2005)
Figure 3.2: Definition of the shadow economy.
Feige (1981) thus defines the unobserved sector as all economic activity that
escapes the measurement of the GDP because of accounting conventions, non-
reporting or underreporting. In a later application, Feige (1989) defines the un-
derground economy as “those economic activities and the income derived from
them that circumvent or otherwise elude government regulation, taxation or ob-
servation”, which is considered to be a quite wide definition of the informal sector
(Schneider 2005).
3.3.1 The shadow economy
Considering that we shall make use of estimates of the informal sector made by
Schneider (2005), we will discuss his definition of what he calls the shadow economy
(see figure 3.2). This definition is constructed to fit the empirical strategy in this
study of the informal sector in 110 countries worldwide. We see that the definition
hinges on the economic activities that are hidden from the public authorities in
order to avoid taxes, regulations and other administrative costs, where the impact
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of (the burden of) taxes and regulations are the most important ones in Schneider
(2005). This definition of the informal sector underlies the MIMIC model that is
used to estimate the size of the informal sector (see section 5.3).
Schneider (2005) does not elaborate on how the informal sector relates to the of-
ficial /formal economy. To get a more comprehensive understanding of how the
underground economy is categorized by the author, we look at a figure from Schnei-
der & Enste (2002) (see figure 3.3.). This figure depicts the dual economy, a crude
representation of how the overall economy is divided. The term underground econ-
omy is used as the opposing part to the official sector/economy, constituting the
unobserved economy (in terms of not entering the estimation of the official GNP).
Here the underground economy is defined as all economic activities that contribute
to the national product, but are left out of the calculation of the national prod-
uct for certain reasons. I.e. the definition of the informal sector is income-based.
Schneider & Enste (2002) mentions three reasons why these activities are not
registered: (1) they are not recorded because of customs (2) because it cannot be
recorded, or partly because of the lack of appropriate methods, and (3) because the
value-added of these activities are not observable. The first point is associated with
the self-sufficiency economy (household production and non-market transactions),
while the last is associated with the informal sector. Thus the informal sector is
defined by the unobservable value-added from market-based transactions. This
conforms with the definition of the shadow economy in Schneider (2005).
Consider now figure 3.4. This figure takes account of the legal dimension of infor-
mal activities. Here we notice the that Schneider & Enste (2002) uses the term
irregular sector to describe the part of the shadow economy that involves the illegal
production and distribution of legal output, excluding the criminal sector (illegal
output).7 This irregular sector coexists with a informal sector that is defined to
be synonymous to the self-sufficient economy. Thus the informal sector is very
narrowly defined in this context. This contradicts some of the literature on the
7Thomas (1992) uses this categorization to capture the different sectors of informal economic
activity.
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National economy
(Dual economy)
Official sector
(Formal sector, first economy)
Underground economy
(Informal economic activity, second economy)
Public sector
(Public institutions and firms)
Private sector
(Private households and firms)
shadow economy
(Market transactions)
Household economy
(Self-sufficient economy)
Official (registered) GNP Not registrable Hidden GDP
Excluded
from GDP
Not registrable
Figure 3.3: The dual economy.
informal sector/economy in developing countries, were there seldom are made a
distinction between the informal or irregular sectors on the basis of whether the
production and distribution are legal or not (most distinguishes on the basis of the
status of the economic unit, i.e. whether the enterprise or its workers are formal
or not). Schneider & Enste (2002) makes it clear that “The informal sector is
predominant in developing and transforming countries where small firms produce
a large share of the economic added value.” Furthermore, the informal sector are
rarely prosecuted, thus it may be defined in terms of governmental enforcement
or supervision. It is therefore rarely connected to tax evasion. However, this dis-
tinction makes it clear what Schneider & Enste (2002) are mainly focusing on, i.e.
illicit work8. This focus may be attributed to the fact that Schneider & Enste
(2002) is focusing mainly on developed countries.
It is important to understand that the main distinguishing characteristic of the
informal and irregular sectors are that the authorities want to prosecute firms and
workers in the irregular sector, while those in the informal sector are left alone (see
Thomas (1992) that uses a classification system that conforms to the classification
system in figure 3.4). Considering that we later will use shadow economy estimates
8Often referred to as black labour in developed economies.
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Household sector Informal sector Irregular sector Criminal sector
Production/
distribution
legal legal illegal illegal
Market transac-
tions
no yes yes yes
Output (goods/
services)
legal legal legal illegal
Examples Do-it-yourself
home office work;
baby-sitting;
exchange of goods
Neighbourhood
help; coun-
selling centres;
self-help or-
ganizations;
honorary activ-
ities; network
help
Illicit work Trade with
stolen goods
and drugs;
prohibited
gambling;
fraud; smug-
gling; stolen
goods
Figure 3.4: Categorization of informal economic activities.
(figure 3.2), it is difficult to establish whether the informal sector is included in the
measurement of the shadow economy or only partly (granted that the definition
of the shadow economy conforms with the definition of the irregular economy9).
What we do know is that these definitions are made to describe some part of the
economy that is unrecorded in the national statistics, and this applies to both the
informal and irregular sectors. At the outset, this thesis is about development and
informal economic activities, and we will generally not make such a distinction
between an informal sector and an irregular sector.
9Thomas (1992) defines the irregular sector as consisting of economic activities associated
with tax evasion, avoidance of economic legislation, avoidance of bureaucracy, social security
fraud and illegal immigration.

Chapter 4
Causes and consequences of
informality
4.1 Theories related to the informal sector
Due to the diversity of focus and approaches, there has unfortunately not been
developed a general theory of the informal sector. This is partly because most
researchers does not approve of the simplistic notion of a dual economy, but also
because there lacks a general agreement of what the informal sector or economy
is. Furthermore, the literature is fraught with anecdotal evidence that is mostly
based on studies in particular regions of the world. Thus it seems like “. . . almost
every possible explanation has been given” as Gërxhani (2004) put it. We will
however discuss some different attempts that have been made to explain informal
economic activities in term of their relationship with the formal economy and the
motives people and enterprises have to enter the informal domain.
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4.1.1 The dual economy approach
Originating from the notion of a dual economy in Boeke (1953) and others, mod-
els were developed to explain the dynamics between the rural agricultural sector
and urban modern sector by Lewis (1954) and later by Harris & Todaro (1970).
These models did not discuss the informal sector at the outset (they were rather
discussing rural-urban migration), but has later been expanded by e.g. Fields
(1975) to include assumptions such that a majority of the urban unemployed are
considered to be working in the urban informal sector. It is here theorized that
all workers that are in the informal sector (and those that migrate from the ru-
ral sector) are trying to get a job in the modern sector, and that the informal
sector works as a fallback option for those who fail to get a modern sector job.
The informal sector is considered to offer subsistence to the urban poor in this
setting. One important feature of this expanded model is to explain why there
may be wage differences between the informal and modern sectors and why the
rural population continues to migrate to the urban sector despite the slim chances
of getting a job in the small modern sector. This approach has been criticized
for its simplistic dual economy assumption; that there are informal workers in the
urban sector only, and that all workers in the informal sector wants to work in the
modern sector (Thomas 1992).
4.1.2 Tax evasion
Tax evasion is the most studied phenomenon in the economic literature on infor-
mality. The theoretical contributions to theories of tax evasion may roughly be
divided in two categories, depending on the assumptions made on the role that
the government plays. The first assumes that the government is controlled by
a benevolent dictator, a characteristic assumed in social welfare theories (among
those are the optimal taxation theory developed by Allingham & Sandmo (1972)
among others); the second assumes that government agents are rational utility
maximizers, known from public choice theory.
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Optimal taxation theory is about how the government chooses the optimal tax
policy (in terms of tax and penalty rates) to maximize welfare by increasing the
tax revenue or tax pool. Alternatively, one may define the problem to be how
the government tries to minimize the total burden of taxation (Wintrobe 2001).
The only reason for people to pay taxes is to avoid being caught for tax fraud by
government prosecution. Increasing the tax rate will increase the tax revenue but
reduce the supply of labour, as some workers will avoid the increased taxes. This
theory assumes that people avoid taxes in response to tax increases, not necessarily
evade them. What optimal taxation theory fails to explain is that some people may
choose to supply their labour hours in the informal sector instead of in the formal
economy. Another problem with this theory is that it fails to take into account
the impact of the quality of public goods that the government offers, a common
characteristic of public choice theory. Attempts have been made to introduce
the impact of public goods by Cowell & Gordon (1988) and they find that with
decreasing absolute risk aversion and under-provision of public goods, tax evasion
will increase in response to improved public goods provision financed by higher tax
rates. This general proposition has found little empirical support however. Most
rather find that taxpayers take into account both the cost of higher taxes as well
as the perceived improvement in public goods provision when deciding to evade
taxes (Gërxhani 2004).
One other weakness with models of optimal taxation is that the probability of being
detected seems to be very low in most cases (as is the magnitude of penalties).
This suggests that there must be other factors that constrain the behaviour of
the taxpayer. Mordignon (1992) includes the effect of individuals’ perception of
fairness regarding their choice to evade taxes. If individuals believe that many
others are evading taxes, then so will they. Thus the perceived fairness of tax
policies induces individuals to evade. The result of such factors is that individuals
may decide to comply with government taxes although it is in their best interest
to evade taxes.
Wintrobe (2001) takes on a similar approach in his public choice model of tax
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evasion (assuming rational government agents). Arguing that individuals have
the incentive to free-ride no matter how compliant all others are, he assumes
a relation built on individuals’ trust in the government to deliver the promised
public goods and in all tax payers to pay taxes. If an individual does not fully
trust the government to provide and fellow taxpayers to comply, her willingness to
pay decreases. At the margin where the individual has zero willingness to pay, she
will only pay according to the standard models of optimal taxation, i.e. maximize
the expected income with respect to tax rates ad detection rates (taking account of
risk aversion). Thus Wintrobe (2001) predicts that we will see higher levels of tax
evasion in societies where the citizens’ trust in the government and each other are
low. Without trust it is difficult for the government to predict what the citizens
want, and in such a situation they are likely to provide less than optimal public
goods provision. This is also the case if individuals have very diverse preferences
(difficult to satisfy everybody’s preferences) or if the government is corrupt. In
the end, it is the individuals’ surplus of income and public goods that determine
the level of tax evasion, and the effect of increased taxes is that the propensity to
evade taxes decreases if it increases the surplus of the citizen, assuming that public
goods are under-provided initially (otherwise surplus would decrease).
4.2 Causes of informality
There are both economic and non-economic reasons for participation in the infor-
mal sector. The economic motives relate to unemployment, an inflexible formal
labour market and cost advantages in the informal production in terms of e.g.
lower real capital prices. Greater flexibility and satisfaction on work, more leisure
time and the benefit of utilizing more of ones qualifications are examples of non-
economic motives to move to the informal sector (Gërxhani 2004). In a behavioural
economics perspective, Renooy (1990) discusses two types of factors that are im-
portant in determining whether people choose to engage in informal activities, i.e.
structural and opportunity factors. The structural factors are financial pressure,
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socia-psychological factors and institutional constraints. The opportunity factors
are made up from the individual skills, network and living situation; as well as
the environment,social norms and tradition, values and standards. According to
Renooy (1990) the opportunity factors explain why there exists informal economic
activity. In this context the attitudes towards the government are particularly
important, and together with the information set that individuals base their de-
cisions on, people will decide on how they will comply with governmental taxes
and regulations. In cases where the government has low credibility, the barriers to
entering the informal sector is lowered to a large extent.
The increased (actual and perceived) burden of taxes and social security contribu-
tions are considered to be some of the most important causes of the development
of the informal sector. Increasing direct and indirect taxes affect labour-leisure
choices and the choice to take the plunge into the informal sector. The higher the
difference between post-tax earnings and total labour cost in the formal labour
market, the higher will the incentive become to evade the formal sector and earn
a tax-free living in the informal sector. This difference depends largely on the tax
and social security system and is a key feature of the existence and prevalence of
the informal sector (Schneider 2005). An important aspect is the complexity of the
tax system. The more complex the tax system is, the higher is the actual and per-
ceived burden of the taxes. Furthermore, this makes it more difficult to determine
the ones who are the winners and losers in the government redistribution scheme,
making it more likely that most individuals feel that they are left out of the loop,
creating an environment of distrust in the government. This may contribute to
the individual’s choice to enter into informal activities (Schneider & Enste 2002)1.
This effect is related to the tax moral of the citizens and their inherent propensity
to evade taxes and work illicitly, which also is seen as an important determinant
to the development of the informal sector.
Another common determinant to the informal sector is the so-called intensity of
regulations, often measured by the number of laws and regulations that exists in
1See section 4.3.2.
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the formal sector. Excessive permit licensing, administrative procedures, red tape
and bribes makes it difficult to establish an enterprise, and many are forced to
work in or start up a small firm in the informal sector due to large entry costs.
There may also be costly labour market regulations that make it more attractive
to hire informal workers (both in formal and informal enterprises). As these costs
may easily be transferred to the workers, additional incentives are created to work
in the informal sector (Enste 2003).
4.3 Effects of an increasing informal sector
Schneider & Enste (2002) gives a broad discussion2 on the macroeconomic effects
of an increasing informal sector. They divide the effects into four categories:
Allocation effects, distribution effects, stabilization effects and fiscal effects.
4.3.1 Allocation effects
Allocation effects may improve welfare by increasing the overall production without
using more input or by producing the same volumes with less input.
The negative effects of a larger informal sector is that (1) it entails pure waste of
economic resources for both those who work in the informal sector that have costs
entailed by staying hidden from the view of controllers and regulators, and for the
authorities that have costs related to the control, supervision and persecution of
informal activities; (2) there is too low capital intensity in the informal sector due
to the lack of credit (because of the risk of being detected and losing all invested
capital, and because of the illegality) and due to the low labour intensity in the
formal sector (because of the burden of taxation, rules and regulations for formal
enterprises, making capital relatively less expensive); (3) competition is distorted
because of tax evasion, informal enterprises get a cost advantage while formal
enterprises must pay ever increasing taxes, thus creating a disadvantage for those
2This discussion is partly based on empirical evidence.
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enterprises that are honest and (in most cases) more productive (this may give
rise to a vicious cycle of more informal activity and low productivity); (4) reduced
economic growth potential due to little or no investment in human capital in the
informal sector (because of the risk of losing everything if one is detected) and due
to the lack of institutional protection, such as the protection of private property;
and (5) less public goods provision (or lower quality) due to a lower tax yield,
e.g. reducing the financing of infrastructure which may lead to reduced economic
growth (see section 4.4).
The positive effects are that (1) price mechanisms may be improved (if competition
in the formal sector is very distorted) and reflect relative scarcity better since there
is higher price flexibility in the informal sector (no regulations)3; (2) the division
of labour is improved (excluding self-employment and do-it-yourself activities),
leading to a rise in welfare due to comparative and absolute cost advantages; (3)
competition is intensified (which is particularly beneficial when formal enterprises
are artificially protected by the government), although these benefits are hampered
by the distortions already mentioned, such that the overall effect is ambiguous; (4)
scarce resources are used; (5) there may be additional potential for innovation in
the informal sector, because it consists of more risk-loving entrepreneurs (staying in
the informal sector implies that they must endure much more risk that those in the
formal sector, i.e. there are few possibilities of insurance); (6) the informal sector
creates income and demand, and employs unused factors (mostly labour) thus
improving the economy’s mode of production and reducing “real” unemployment
and underemployment ; and (7) they add to the supply of goods and services.
Although the overall allocation effects of an increased informal sector is somewhat
ambiguous, Schneider & Enste (2002) concludes that
“[. . . ] a net gain in productivity and employment can be expected, ow-
ing to the stimulation of competition. [. . . ] Making the whole system
3Schneider & Enste (2002) states that this may be an important point in developing countries
where the economies “are burdened by over-regulation and administration, [. . . ] which holds
back economic growth considerably.
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more dynamic leads to an increase in international competitiveness in
the medium term and to a stimulation of the official economy.”
But since the informal economy employs too little capital, it may be that if illicit
work gains momentum, the economy’s production potential decline as the volumes
of capital and material assets decline:
“Hence, growth is hampered in the long run, which weakens the positive
effects gained from the stimulation of competition. The low intensity of
research and technology in the shadow economy has roughly the same
effect. The potential for innovation, especially in the high technology
sector, is lost if the capital supply decreases.”
However, taking account of the positive effects of utilizing unused factors, improved
division of labour etc., Schneider & Enste (2002) believes that the overall effect is
positive.4
4.3.2 Distribution effects
Regarding the issue of equality of distribution, the informal activities such as
tax evasion and illicit work is considered to be a threat to the tax system and
ultimately to the financial basis of the state. This is because individuals engaged
in e.g. illicit work are free riders that may use public goods and infrastructure
without paying taxes. This will reduce the tax yield, and reduce public investment
and public goods provision, which will hurt the middle and lower income classes
the most.
The situation will most likely become even worse if the government decides to
reduce the social budget in order to reduce the tax deficit. This will in particular
hurt those households who are unable to profit from additional income made in
the informal sector, thereby punishing those who are moral and risk averse since
4It should again be noted that this discussion has a primary focus on informality in developed
countries.
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they will receive relatively less in transfer payments.
4.3.3 Stabilization effects
One thing that many economists in this area of research is emphasizing is that the
informal sector distorts the economic indicators of the official statistics. This may
lead to wrong policy decisions, possibly exaggerating the business cycles and desta-
bilizing the economy. Examples of such distortions are (1) miscalculation of GNP;
(2) of economic growth rates (the informal sector may grow at a different pace that
the formal sector); (3) inflation rates are systematically too high (assuming prices
grow more slowly in the informal sector); and (4) unemployment rates are too high
(assuming that individuals working in the informal sector does register themselves
as unemployed). This leads to the over- and understatement of several economic
phenomena, such as the alleged overstatement of the unemployment rates after
the oil crisis in the seventies.
The impact of informal activities on policy-making constitutes an indirect effect.
But there are also more direct effects of an increasing informal sector: At one
hand there are negative consequences for the formal labour market in terms of
distorted competition5, but there may also be possible short and medium term
positive effects, considering how the informal sector may act as a stabilizing buffer
to the formal sector, absorbing formal unemployment and excess demand in times
of recession. Furthermore, the informal sector promotes flexibility of prices and
wages, making the economy absorb exogenous shocks better. Thus the informal
sector may counteract the general business cycle (especially if there is profound
government failure) and increase macroeconomic stability. In the long run how-
ever, the negative effects on fiscal policy and society will be too important too
neglect.
5See section 4.3.1.
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4.3.4 Fiscal effects
An expansion of the informal sector leads to a reduction in the tax yield. The
main problem related to less tax yield is that the government is unable to provide
the same level of public benefits without increasing the rate of taxes. This sparks
a downward spiral of increasing informal activity and taxes and decreasing tax
base and social security contributions. But it is believed that most of the extra
income that is created is spent in the formal economy, thus a large part of the lost
yield “flows back into the official sector in the form of consumption” (Schneider &
Enste 2002). But how much of the yield that comes back into the official sector
remains controversial as is the overall impact on demand of goods and services in
the formal and informal sector.
4.4 Informality and (GDP) growth
As with most aspects of informality there is little consensus regarding the impact
of informal activities on development and GDP growth.6 We shall discuss some
different approaches to this subject.
In one application, Adam & Ginsburgh (1985) presents a macroeconomic model
that takes account of both the formal and informal sectors, with emphasis on the
labour market differences in the two sectors (excess labour supply, tax evasion and
wage flexibility in the informal sector). Although the authors does not focus on
the direct impact of a increase of the size of the informal economy, they make a
few important inferences regarding the impact of fiscal policy on the formal and
informal sectors:
• The informal sector is always stimulated by fiscal policies, but not necessarily
as much as the formal sector.
6In lack of better alternatives, most economists use GDP growth as an indicator of develop-
ment.
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• The impact on the formal sector of an increase in final demand is reduced in
presence of the informal economy
Hence, Adam & Ginsburgh (1985) finds that an increase in the size of the informal
sector is associated with an increase in the size of the formal one, at least in the
case of fiscal policy.
A different view is taken by Loaysa (1996) that presents a theoretical model of en-
dogenous growth that links the informal sector with public goods provision and the
GDP growth rate. In this model it is assumed that production in the formal sector
depends on tax-finaced public goods (that is subject to congestion). Since the in-
formal sector does not pay taxes but penalties (that is assumed not to contribute
to the public goods provision), an increase in the size of the informal sector will re-
duce the tax base and thus reduce the GDP per capita growth rate since the public
goods provision is lowered. In particular, this is thought to occur in economies
where governments employ “excessive” taxes combined with the inability to en-
force compliance to the tax scheme. The model therefore predicts that there will
be a negative relationship between the size of the informal sector and GDP per
capita growth. This result is not wholeheartedly accepted by Asea (1996) that
criticize the treatment in Loaysa (1996) on the grounds that “neither the model
nor the empirical analysis can speak directly to the question of what leads to the
rise of the informal sector.” Especially the empirical analysis of Loaysa (1996) fails
to establish causality relations between the informal and formal sectors. On the
theoretical level, Asea (1996) suggests that a theoretical model should incorporate
the decision making process of both entrepreneurs (to participate in the infor-
mal sector) and policy-makers (to which levels of taxes and detection efforts one
should apply), in addition to taking account of the fact that entrepreneurial abil-
ity is not uniformly distributed (an important determinant for the entrepreneurs
decision-making and unknown to the entrepreneur initially).7
Considering that the effects of an increase in the size of the informal economy on
GDP growth are ambiguous, Schneider (2005) suggest that there may be differences
7This way of modelling refers to the theoretical model of Levenson & Maloney (1998).
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in impact depending on whether the economy has high or low income:
“It may be that on the one hand in high-income countries people/entrepreneurs
are overburdened by taxes and regulation so that an increasing shadow
economy stimulates the official economy as additional value-added is
created and the additional income earned in the shadow economy is
spent in the official economy. On the other hand, in low-income coun-
tries an increasing shadow economy erodes the tax base, with the con-
sequence of a lower provision of public infrastructure and basic public
services (for example an effective juridical system), with the final con-
sequence of lower official growth.”
Thus Schneider (2005) argues that there are differences in how informality affects
the formal economy in developed and developing countries, but he does not elab-
orate on e.g. whether there are any critical threshold levels for the informal sector
that makes the negative impact of reduced tax base more pronounced than the
positive value added effects.
Chapter 5
Measuring the size of the
informal sector.
Schneider & Enste (2002) gives an account of the different methods that may be
used to estimate the size of the informal sector.1 These methods may be divided
into direct and indirect approaches of estimation. It is important to note that
these methods differ much in respect to what they intend to measure; some of
them focus only on e.g. tax evasion.
The different methods to measure the informal sector may be classified by their
use of either individual (microeconomic) or aggregate (macro) data. The former
approach is based on direct investigation of individual behaviour, while the latter
approach is based on indirect inference, utilizing economic indicators and/or de-
terminants to estimate the magnitude of the informal economy. In this chapter
we will discuss these direct and indirect approaches, with emphasis on the MIMIC
approach that accounts for the measurement of the informal economy that we will
employ in our empirical treatment of informality and development.
1Schneider & Enste (2002) uses the term shadow economy most of the time, but this term
is rarely used to describe the informal sector in developing countries. Perhaps not so surpris-
ing considering that most empirical applications of these methods are focusing on developed
countries.
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5.1 Direct approaches
5.1.1 Surveys and samples
To gain insight into the structure and dynamics of the informal economy, microeco-
nomic surveys and samples based on voluntary replies are superior to macro-based
studies. But his method must deal with problems of under-reporting by the inter-
viewees since they will hesitate to reveal that they are evading taxes or regulations.
The results are also very sensitive to how the questionnaire is designed. Results
are therefore often unreliable and unfit for estimating monetary magnitudes of
informality (Schneider & Enste 2002).
The method of voluntary surveys and samples has been used by Andresen, Ognedal
& Strøm (2005) to uncover the unreported wage income in Norway from 1980 to
2003. Despite the difficulties involved with voluntary surveys, they managed to
establish that the magnitude of illicit work has decreased over the last decades,
possibly due to improved tax morale and lower taxes. Due to the uncertainty
regarding these results, they may be taken as a lower bounds on the size of the
informal sector.2
5.1.2 Tax audits
One other direct approach to measuring the size of the informal economy is to ex-
amine the discrepancy between reported income and actual income, where actual
income often is found through tax audits. Fiscal auditing programmes have been
effective in revealing the extent of undeclared taxable income, and have been used
to estimate the informal sector. The main problem with this method is due to a
selection bias of audit cases that are meant to find cases where the probability of
non-compliance is high. Hence the population investigated is not random. Fur-
thermore, only a fraction of the non-compliant income-earners will be detected by
2Isacsen & Strøm (1989) states that “it is safe to assume that [the method of voluntary surveys
samples] will underestimate the size of the hidden labour market.”
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this procedure. The resulting magnitude of the clandestine economic income will
thus be downwards biased. Feinstein (1999) discusses how to overcome some of this
issues with the method called detection controlled estimation. This model takes
the detection process into account, estimating the undetected non-compliance.
This model may be extended to ordinary enforcement data, but this data must
be corrected since it is drawn non-randomly. This model has its strengths in
that it focuses on the detection process (which often is ignored in discussions of
detection of non-compliance), and that it gives a precise mathematical formula
for estimating non-compliance. An important problem with the model is that it
has problems with parameter identification, in particular when estimating average
levels of non-compliance.
5.2 Indirect approaches
Most studies that utilize the direct approach are focusing mainly on tax evasion
in developed countries. To be able to obtain estimates of the informal economy
(by any definition) that are comparable across countries there has been developed
indirect methods that estimate the informal economy. Most of these methods are
macroeconomic in nature and uses indicators or determinants to extract informa-
tion on the development of the unobserved informal economy.
5.2.1 The expenditure-income discrepancy method
This expenditure-income discrepancy (residual) method compares the national
statistics on income and expenditure. Theorizing that these two should be equal if
the statistics were exhaustive, any discrepancy would arise from underreporting at
the income-side of the national economy3 (and preferably nothing else). This dis-
crepancy could be taken as an estimate of the unobserved/hidden economy (GDP)
that has not been reported to the central authorities. This method suffers from the
3This method also been applied at the household level, see O’Higgins (1989).
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fact that the resulting estimate reflects any measurement errors that arise in the
national accounting (of both expenditure and income) and that national account
statisticians have an incentive to try to minimize this discrepancy. Inherent to the
method is the assumption of higher expenditures than income; if this were to be
violated, it would imply a negative hidden economy. Although there is little doubt
that there is a relationship between this discrepancy and hidden activities, the
method fails to take into account other factors that are important to the national
accounts calculations. The discrepancy may e.g. reflect the behaviour of the tax
authorities rather than hidden activities (Frey & Pommerehne 1984).
It is normally assumed that the measurement of the expenditure are independent
and unbiased, but that assumption is found to be violated in many cases as large
parts of the expenditure are estimated on the basis of retail sales and turnover
(Smith 1986). Considering that national expenditure and income measures are
crude estimates themselves, the expenditure-income discrepancy method must be
regarded as a profoundly crude estimate.
According to O’Higgins (1989), the crude income-expenditure discrepancy or first
initial (residual) difference may be divided into three parts:
1. underreporting of income
2. timing errors that arise when simultaneous events are recorded at different
time periods
3. other estimating errors
The latter two are together termed the residual error and is found by controlling
for underreporting. This residual shows a large degree of variability and weakens
the estimates of the hidden economy, making it unfit to e.g. compute growth
rates of the relative size of the hidden economy. Some of these residuals are
negative in value, which makes them difficult to interpret in terms of tax evasion
(Thomas 1992).
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5.2.2 The discrepancy between the official and actual labour
force
This method assumes that the official labour market and the informal labour mar-
ket are tightly interconnected and that any changes in the size of the official labour
force must be answered by an opposite change in the informal labour market (as-
suming that the total labour force is constant). This approach is criticized on the
grounds that it excludes other determinants of changes in the labour market, which
means that the assumption of a constant partition is dubious. Another point is
that workers may be employed in both the official and informal economy (moon-
lighting) which makes the issue of measurement even more difficult (Schneider &
Enste 2002, Frey & Pommerehne 1984).
5.2.3 The currency demand approach
One common hypothesis states that to remain hidden and undetected, people in
the informal sector must use cash transactions to wipe out any trace of irregular
economic activity (which are illegal by law). It is theorized that an increase in the
size of the informal sector must lead to increased demand for currency to complete
the additional transactions made. This has led to the development of monetary
methods to measure the size of the informal sector.
The currency demand approach is one such monetary method. It is one of the most
widely applied methods for estimating the size of the informal economy, and was
first developed by Cagan (1958), who studied the relationship between currency
demand and tax pressure in the United States before and during the second World
War. This approach has been further developed to include econometric properties
by Tanzi (1980, 1983). Comparing with a scenario with no informal sector, it
is possible to derive an excess demand function that may be attributed to the
informal sector’s demand for cash:
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C/M2 is the ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts, TW is weighted
average tax rate (proxy for changes in the size of the informal sector), WS/Y
is the proportion of salaries and wages in national income (captures changing
payment and money holding patterns), R is the interest rate on saving deposits
(opportunity cost) and Y/N is the per capita income. It may be expanded by
including variables for the intensity of regulation, other taxes and the complexity of
the tax system, which are important determinants of the informal sector (Schneider
& Enste 2002).
Excess currency demand is the currency demand that is not explained by the
factors above is then attributed to factors determining the size of the informal
sector, such as increased tax burden or increased intensity of regulations. With
the assumption that the velocity of currency is the same for both the official and
informal sector, the size of the informal sector may be derived. Another important
assumption is that there needs to be set a base year of the estimation for which
the informal sector is non-existent. This happens when TW = 0, and the excess
currency demand is found by comparing the currency ratio with and without the
impact of the informal sector (proxied by the TW -term of the right hand side of
the equation above).
The currency demand approach has several shortcomings:
• The velocity of money in the official economy is hard to quantify, the money
velocity of the informal sector even more so. Furthermore, the estimation
procedure is very sensitive to small changes in the money velocity (Klovland
1984).
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• The assumption of a non-existent informal sector at any time period through
history is questionable. Small changes in the base year may give rise to large
differences in the estimated size of the informal sector. Moving the base year
backwards in time increases the size of the informal sector at later periods.
Thus the informal sector will be underestimated (Schneider 2005).
• Regarding the American economy this approach fails to take into account
that American dollars are used outside of the US economy.
• Not all transactions in the informal sector are paid in cash, there are also
e.g. non-monetary barter exchange. This is probably even more important
in developing economies. This will also lead to an underestimation of the
informal sector.
5.2.4 The transactions approach
This approach4 is based on the assumption that there is a constant relationship
between the volume of transactions and GNP. It utilizes Fisher’s quantity equation
MV = pT , where M is money, V is money velocity, p is prices and T is total
transactions. It is assumed that the informal sector GNP may be found by taking
the difference between total nominal GNP and the official GNP. A zero informal
sector base year has to be determined (as in the currency demand method). In
the absence of the informal sector, the ratio pT to official GNP is constant over
time and may be characterized as normal. This method suffers from some of the
same shortcomings as the currency demand method. Furthermore, one important
weakness is that this approach demand precise data on transactions, which rarely
are available. It is also problematic that this method relies on the assumption
that all variation in the ratio between the total value of transactions and the
official GNP comes in response to changes in the informal sector (Schneider &
Enste 2002).
4See Feige (1996).
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5.2.5 The electricity consumption approach
Some of the more recent approaches use physical inputs as indicators of all eco-
nomic activity. One of them is Kaufmann & Kaliberda (1996) that uses the elec-
tricity consumption as an indicator for the overall economic activity. Subtract-
ing official GDP growth from this measure of overall activity (growth in electric
power consumption) reveals the magnitude of the informal sector. This gives us a
very simple and appealing method to quantify the informal sector. It is however
criticized on the basis that not all informal sector activity demands that much
electricity; that other energy sources may be used; that it fails to take account of
technical progress (more efficient use of energy); and that the elasticity of electric-
ity to GDP may not be so stable across country and time (Schneider & Enste 2002).
This is likely to be a larger problem when applying the method to less developed
countries.5
5.3 MIMIC modelling
Considering that we use estimates derived from this method of quantifying the
informal sector, the multiple indicators multiple causes model (MIMIC)6 is impor-
tant. However controversial (as most methods we have discussed), it is considered
to be the most modern approach to informal sector estimation.
The previous methods has only used single indicators to capture the effects of the
informal sector, but in the MIMIC framework one takes account of not only several
indicators, but also several “cause variables” that determine the size of the informal
sector. Thus the MIMIC approach is able to include the impact of not only the
burden of taxation, but also the impact of the burden of state regulation, income
differentials and other factors that may affect the development of the informal
5A similar method has been developed by Lackó (1998) which also uses electricity consump-
tion, but takes account of differing consumption patterns across economies such that the informal
sector have differing electricity consumption across economies.
6Also termed DYMIMIC in cases of dynamic time-series estimation.
5.3 MIMIC modelling 43
Informal sector
(latent variable)
!!!!" ##
##$
%%%& '''(
'''
'( %%%%&
##
##
#$ !!!!!"
Causes
Tax burden
Regulation density
Tax moral
. . .
Indicators
Unemployment
Currency demand
GDP growth
. . .
Figure 5.1: MIMIC model.
sector. In this way we may take into account the simultaneous effects driving
the informal sector (by cause variables) and its effects on the indicators. This
method is also sometimes labelled latent variable estimation since it estimates an
unobservable and immeasurable (latent) variable by means of other observable
variables (see figure 5.1 for an example of how the MIMIC model is constructed).
This is done by a structural equation model consisting of two parts, a measurement
model linking the unobserved variable (the informal sector) with a set of indicators;
and a structural model, linking the unobserved variable with a set of cause variables
that are thought to have an impact on the unobserved variable (Schneider &
Enste 2002) We may formulate the MIMIC model as follows:7
yt = ληt + εt
ηt = γ
′xt + ξt
yt is a vector of indicator variables, η is the unobserved latent variable (scalar), xt is
a vector of cause variables. γ and λ are unknown coefficient vectors. To be able to
obtain estimates from this model we need to use a normalization condition. There
are several ways of doing this, e.g. Schneider (2005) assumes that the first element
of λ if equal to −1 (thus assuming that the coefficient on the latent variable from
the first indicator is equal to −1). The resulting estimates produces only relative
7Found in Breusch (2005b).
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values of the latent variable, it is therefore needed to calibrate8 the time-series
estimates (in the case of DYMIMIC estimation) to obtain values of the latent
variable in units of observation that are relevant to the context (e.g. the share of
informal sector to GDP). This is often done by anchoring the value of the latent
variable at some point in time, e.g. by using some average value of the size of the
informal sector obtained by the currency demand method or perhaps by taking
the average estimate from a range of methods.
The MIMIC method has been criticized on several points. Probably the most
important point of criticism is the one regarding the calibration of the estimates
produced by the MIMIC method (Dell’Anno & Schneider 2006). According to
Breusch (2005b) “[t]he data are typically transformed in ways that [. . . ] have
the unfortunate effect of making the results of the study sensitive to the units to
which the variables are measured.” Understanding how the calibration procedure
is performed is therefore substantive when evaluating MIMIC estimates of the
informal sector.9
5.4 Controversy of measurement
According to Thomas (1999), there is a genuine lack of theory applied in the
literature that seeks to estimate the size of the hidden economy. This has profound
implications since this renders the estimates useless for policy-makers since there
is no theoretical framework to tell us what it means to have an guesstimated
hidden economy at 20 per cent of GDP.10 In his concluding remarks, Thomas
(1999) emphasizes that one should take note of the microeconomic implications
when considering the large macro-numbers that is found in much of the hidden
economy literature. On how to interpret the guesstimates of Feige (1981), he states
that
8Often coined benchmarking.
9Dell’Anno & Schneider (2006) suggests some new “benchmark” procedures.
10Journalists however, knows what to do with these numbers.
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Canada Germany Great Britain
Method 1970
-75
1976
-80
1981
-85
1986
-90
1970
-75
1976
-80
1981
-85
1986
-90
1970
-75
1976
-80
1981
-85
1986
-90
Surveys of house-
holds
- - 1.3 1.4 3.6 - - - 1.5 - - -
Tax auditing - - 2.9 - - - - - - - - -
Discrepancy bet.
exp. and income
- - - - 11.0 10.2 13.4 - 2.5 3.6 4.2 -
Employment dis-
crepancy
- - - - 23.0 38.5 34.0 - - - - -
Physical input - - - 11.2 - - - 14.5 - - - 13.2
Currency demand 5.1 6.3 8.8 12.0 4.5 7.8 9.2 11.3 4.3 7.9 8.5 9.7
Cash deposit ratio 13.8 15.9 11.2 18.4 - - - - 14.0 7.2 6.2 -
Transactions - 26.5 15.4 21.2 17.2 22.3 29.3 31.4 17.2 12.6 15.9 -
MIMIC - 8.7 - - 5.8 6.1 8.2 - - 8.0 - -
Values are groups (averaged when possible) in time periods in order to undertake a rough comparison. The
cash deposit ratio method is a forerunner to the currency demand method.
Sources: See Schneider & Enste (2000).
Table 5.1: A comparison of estimates of different methods.
“Rather than accepting these magic numbers we should ask the obvious
microeconomic questions: Are we seriously expected to believe that the
production of goods and services in the black economy could increase
from 8% of GDP in 1971 to 22% in 1974 and then fall to 14% in
1975 without being observed? Where was this all happening? Who
was doing it and how were they hiding their activities? What are the
implications for policy makers - what should they do? Without an
answer to such questions we should be sceptical and, in particular,
resist the use of anecdotal evidence to support such claims”
This hits right at the hart of the problems with estimating the informal sector.
It is not just one single entity that is observable to those who operate within (or
outside) it, and its properties may not be constant over time. One should therefore
not just accept such figures when there is no framework to interpret these results,
and no fully accepted theoretical models to explain the dynamics and mechanics
underlying these figures. Many economists in the field seem however to be aware
of this, and stresses that this is a discipline in development and that one should
interpret and use these estimates with much caution.
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Italy United States
Method 1970
-75
1976
-80
1981
-85
1986
-90
1970
-75
1976
-80
1981
-85
1986
-90
Surveys of households - - - - 3.7 4.5 5.6 -
Tax auditing 3.0 3.9 - 10.0 4.9 6.3 8.2 10.0
Discrepancy bet. exp. and income 3.2 4.3 - 9.3 3.2 4.9 6.1 10.2
Employment discrepancy - 18.4 - - - - - -
Physical input - - - 19.3 - - 7.8 9.9
Currency demand 11.3 13.2 17.5 21.3 3.5 4.6 5.3 6.2
Cash deposit ratio 23.4 27.2 29.3 - 8.8 11.2 14.6 -
Transactions 19.5 26.4 34.3 - 17.3 24.9 21.2 19.4
MIMIC - 10.5 - - - 8.2 - -
Continued from table 5.1.
Loaysa Schneider Absolute
Country 1990-93 1990-91 difference
Argentina 21.8 22.1 0.3
Bolivia 65.6 55.4 10.2
Brazil 37.8 32.5 5.3
Chile 18.2 13.6 4.6
Colombia 35.1 33.4 1.7
Costa Rica 23.3 22.0 1.3
Ecuador 31.2 28.9 2.3
Guatemala 50.4 41.4 9.0
Honduras 46.7 40.7 6.0
Mexico 27.1 24.1 3.0
Panama 62.1 51.4 10.7
Peru 57.9 47.1 10.8
Uruguay 35.2 41.3 6.1
Venezuela 30.8 27.4 3.4
Sources: Loaysa (1996) and Schneider & Enste (2000).
Table 5.2: A comparison of MIMIC estimates.
Chapter 6
Empirical studies of informality
and development
There has been little empirical work on the relationship between informality and
development (measured by income (GDP) growth). Here we shall take a look at the
work of two studies of this subject, by Loaysa (1996) and Schneider (2005).
6.1 Informality and growth in Latin-America
Loaysa (1996) develops a theoretical model1 of endogenous growth and informal-
ity. Subsequently he estimates the size of the informal sector using the MIMIC
modelling approach2, and uses these estimates as an independent variable in a
regression on GDP growth. The hypothesis that is put forward is that policies or
government institutions that promote an increase in the informal sector will also
reduce the growth rate of the economy. The relationship between GDP growth, in-
formal activity, taxes and the quality of institutions3 is studied in the cross-country
1This model is discussed in section 4.4.
2These estimates are found in table 5.2.
3The public infrastructure index consists of per capita electricity consumption, per capita
telephone mainlines, percentage of population with access to safe water and per capita road in
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Dependent variable GDP per capita growth rate 1980-92 Public in-
frastructure
Size of the informal sector -0.8852
(-2.61)*
-0.8435
(-2.16)*
-05814
(-2.98)*
Public infrastructure index 0.5622
(1.69)+
0.0718
(0.24)
Corporate income tax rate -0.4436
(-1.09)
Labour-market restrictions -0.4333
(-0.84)
Strength and efficiency of gov-
ernment institutions
0.3598
(1.16)
P-value (F-statistic) 0.0233 0.0798
Adjusted R2 0.3584 0.1201 0.3068 0.2537 0.3381
Number of observations 14 14 14 14 14
The above t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. Regression
coefficients are standardized so that they reflect the change in the growth rate produced by a one-
standard deviation of the explanatory variable. +: significant at 10%; *: significant at 5%.
Source: Loaysa (1996).
Table 6.1: Growth effects of public infrastructure and informal sector.
regression (see table 6.1). Despite very few observations (only 14 countries), the
results are fairly strong. The size of the informal sector has a negative impact on
GDP growth, even when accounting for the public infrastructure index. A negative
relationship is also established between the index and the informal sector. This
may explain why it seems like the informal sector variable removes the explanatory
power of the index in the growth regression. A regression with the determinants of
the informal sector replacing the informal sector and public infrastructure index
shows that the variables have the expected signs, but they are not individually
significant (which may be due to multicollinearity according to the author).
To check that the informal sector variable is not a proxy for some other underlying
determinant of growth, Loaysa (1996) performs a regression on growth using the
informal sector variable and other plausible determinants (shown in table 6.2).
Still the informal sector has a significantly negative impact on GDP growth in
Latin-American countries.
good condition.
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Dependent variable GDP per capita growth rate 1980-92
Size of the informal sector -1.282 -1.3165 -1.3303 -1.4555 -1.2245
(-3.33)* (-4.30)* (-3.79)* (-3.45)* (-3.44)*
Real GDP per capita, 1980 -0.6418 -0.7956 -0.8906 -0.1523 -1.9685
(-2.04)* (-2.92)* (-2.80)* (-3.84)* (-4.33)*
Secondary school 0.4302 0.7341 0.8426 0.7118
attainment, 1980 (1.86)+ (2.32)* (2.66)* (2.43)*
Average tariff for -0.5226 -0.6138 -0.3439
Intermediate and (-1.26) (-1.49) (-0.86)
capital goods, 1985
Average inflation rate -0.2497 -0.6027
1980-92 (-0.46) (-1.60)
Public infrastructure index, 1.1966
1990 (2.04)*
P-value (F-statistic) 0.0046 0.0077 0.0305 0.0724 0.0365
Adjusted R2 0.4595 0.5119 0.5222 0.4735 0.6490
Number of observations 12 12 12 12 12
The above t-statistics are computed using heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors.
Regression coefficients are standardized so that they reflect the change in the growth
rate produced by a one-standard deviation of the explanatory variable. +: significant
at 10%; *: significant at 5%.
Source: Loaysa (1996).
Table 6.2: The informal sector and other determinants of growth.
6.2 The informal sector worldwide
In the next chapter we will perform an econometric analysis of the impact of the
informal sector on GDP growth using the MIMIC estimates that are produced
by Schneider (2005); who also uses these estimates in a panel regression of GDP
growth together with other common determinants4 of growth (see table 6.3). This
analysis will therefore act as a benchmark for our empirical analysis. Schneider
(2005) finds that the informal sector has a significantly negative impact on growth
in low-income (developing) countries, but that the effect is significantly positive for
industrialized and transition countries. The estimated coefficients predict that a
one percentage point increase in the informal sector to GDP will increase the GDP
per capita growth rate by 7.7 per cent in high-income and transition countries, but
reduce the growth by 5.2 per cent in developing countries. The author attributes
4Schneider (2005) refers to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Breton (2001) regarding his
choice of variables.
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Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth rate
Shadow economy industrialized countries 0.077** (2.63)
Shadow economy transition countries 0.099** (3.80)
Shadow economy developing countries -0.052** (2.37) -0.045** (2.36)
Openness 0.012**(2.14)
FDI lagged 0.00049 (0.05)
Inflation rate other countries 0.023 (1.32) 0.0263 (1.28)
Inflation rate transition countries -0.021** (4.10) -0.021** (-3.69)
Government consumption -0.181** (3.23) -0.184** (3.25)
Lagged annual GDP per capita growth rate 0.154** (3.06) 0.154** (3.06)
Total population 0.000036** (2.07) 0.000036* (1.80)
Capital accumulation rate 0.019* (1.88) 0.015 (1.42)
Constant 0.062** (4.13) 0.06** (5.00)
Countries 104 83
Overall R-squared 0.347 0.3211
Within R-squared 0.266 0.263
Between R-squared 0.417 0.443
Wald-χ2 94.63 (0.000) 73.89 (0.000)
Random effects GLS-regressions; absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses, *: significant
at 10%; **: significant at 5%. Industrialized countries consist of transition countries and
high-income countries. Source: Schneider (2005).
Table 6.3: GDP growth and the shadow economy.
this to the relief of burdening taxes for high-income country entrepreneurs, and
to the eroded tax base in developing countries which reduces the provision and
quality of public goods, conforming with the reasoning made by Loaysa (1996)
(see section 4.4).
Chapter 7
Empirical study
7.1 Data
All of the data is found in the World Bank’s World Development Index (WDI)
databank; except for the data on the institutional variables. The Democracy vari-
able is from Freedom House and the Rule of Law variable is from The International
Country Risk Guide, published by The PRS Group.1 The data are yearly and are
averaged over the years 1990-91, 1994-95 and 1999-2000 to comply with the time
frame of the informal sector estimates that we find in Schneider (2005). In cases
where we have missing observations, the values are interpolated by taking the aver-
age of the adjacent observations. No extrapolations are made, and some countries
are therefore dropped due to missing data, mostly due to lack of data in the period
1988-1991. Growth rates are computed using the formula
g =
(yt − yt−1)
yt−1
1A description of the variables and their sources is presented in the appendix, along with the
data of the size of the informal sector, GDP per capita, and GDP per capita growth.
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7.2 Empirical Strategy
We will use Stata Intercooled 9.0 to perform fixed and random effects regressions.2
The benchmark specification that we shall use is:
GDP per capita growth rate =
Informal sector in industrialized3 countries or only in transition countries + In-
formal sector developing countries + Lagged log GDP per capita + Openness
+ Inflation rate other countries + Inflation rate transition countries + Govern-
ment Consumption + Total population + Capital accumulation rate + Year dum-
mies
This specification is generally comparable to the one used by Schneider (2005)
(see table 6.3) except for one important difference: We use lagged log of GDP per
capita instead of lagged growth.4 This is because we want to control for growth
convergence, which is typically done in empirical growth models. Convergence
in this context means that we believe that low-income countries will have higher
growth than high-income countries due to a higher growth potential, thus catch-
ing up (slowly) with richer countries over time. Hence we expect the coefficient
on lagged income to be negative. Conforming with Schneider (2005), we expect
the other signs on the estimated coefficients to be positive for the informal sec-
tor in industrialized and transition countries, for openness, lagged GDP growth,
population and capital accumulation. The informal sector in developing countries,
inflation and government consumption are believed to have a negative impact on
GDP growth. We agree with Schneider (2005) on these expectations except for
the presumed negative impact of government consumption. We believe that gov-
ernmental consumption (and thus investment) in itself cannot be bad for growth,
2These panel data models are described in appendix B.
3The group of industrialized consist of transition and developed high-income countries.
4Why Schneider (2005) uses lagged growth is unknown as he does not justify its use. This
could potentially be harmful for the analysis since the lagged dependent variable is correlated
with the country specific effect, which makes the slopes estimator inconsistent (see appedix B).
For comparative purposes we have also performed regressions including the lagged growth rate,
see appendix C.
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but rather the opposite. However, we also acknowledge that not all governmental
consumption in the world is used to promote growth; the overall effect is therefore
ambiguous.
In addition to the specification used by Schneider (2005), we include year dummies
so that we are able to isolate the period-specific effects. This is done to pick up
any period-specific effects (trends) that are not caused by the other variables of
interest. Note that we use the same grouping of countries as Schneider (2005).5
Besides the use of year dummies and substituting the lagged growth rate, the
econometric model and especially the underlying data should be the same as in
the analysis of Schneider (2005).6 Thus we expect to get roughly the same results
for the benchmark specification as we have presented in table 6.3.
There are several types of data we would like to include in a econometric growth
model that is unavailable to us. Most importantly is the lack of data on human
capital (such as schooling and health) and technological growth (inventions). Con-
sidering that we are interested in the development of poor countries, it would be
appropriate to include data on e.g. poverty or indices such as the human de-
velopment index. The problem is that data is not collected in the relevant time
periods or it is too much data missing. For instance, there is no data on male
secondary schooling7 for the years 1994 and 1995, and very little from the years
1990-1991.
There are also some variables that are available to us that is not included in the
specification in Schneider (2005), and that is the institutional variables for politi-
cal rights (or democracy) and the rule of law. These variables are emphasized in
e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) as having a significant importance for GDP
growth empirically. Especially the democracy variable is found to be important
for growth (particularly for those countries that scores low on the democracy in-
5As the only country, Slovenia is in both the high-income and transition group. In our analysis
we do not include this country when high-income countries are left out of the regression.
6Checking the reported sources of Schneider’s (2005) suggests that our WDI data are from
the same databases. This may not be the case however: See appendix D.
7This kind of data is often the most readily available data on educational attainment.
54 Empirical study
dex). Thus we would want to include these variables as well into the benchmark
specification.8
This means that we will run several regressions: First we will run the benchmark
regressions with and without the high-income countries; second, we will run the
same regressions including the institutional variables rule of law, democracy and
squared democracy; and third, we will perform these regressions with both the
fixed and random effects models. A Hausman test of specification will determine
which model is the appropriate one to use.
7.3 Results
7.3.1 Fixed effects
First we will consider the results of the fixed effects regressions. Looking at the
results of the benchmark regression which divides between low and high-income
countries (column (1) in table 7.1), we see that all variables have the expected
signs, but that only half the coefficients are significantly different from zero. Our
results supports the findings of Schneider (2005) that found a positive impact of
informality on growth in high-income countries and a negative impact on growth in
developing countries. Unfortunately the coefficient on the informal sector in indus-
trialized countries is not significant. Assuming that the informal sector increases by
one percentage point to GDP increases GDP growth with 0.089 percentage points.
Using the average growth rate in the industrialized group of 3.80%, this means that
the effect of informality is a 2.26% increase of the growth rate in “industrialized”
countries which is somewhat less than the estimated effect of 7.7% in Schneider
(2005). The same relative increase in the informal sector in developing countries
leads to a 0.42 percentage point reduction of the growth rate. This amounts to an
8There are other such institutional variables that could have been interesting to use, such as
the World Bank’s Governance indicators, but this data only goes back to 1996.
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average growth reduction of 9.93% (5.2% in Schneider (2005)).9
Comparing the other coefficients we see that almost all of the variables have much
smaller coefficient values than compared to Schneider (2005). The exception is
capital accumulation, which is about 2.5 times larger. The coefficients on inflation
and government consumption are particularly small here by our estimates.
Removing the high-income economies (see column (5) in table 7.2) does not change
the results much; most coefficients retain the same level as in the previous speci-
fication. The exception here is that the informal sector coefficients are now both
larger. Although the coefficient is not significant, we note that an increase in the
informal sector by one percentage point to GDP in transition countries leads to
an increase in the GDP growth rate of 0.20 percentage points. The coefficient on
informality in developing countries is highly significant and shows a negative effect
of increasing informality of 0.72 percentage points.10
Adding the institutional variables (in (2) and (6)) changes the results somewhat.
More variables are now statistically significant, suggesting that the institutional
variables improve the fit of the regression model. We also note that the effect of
informality in transition and high-income countries now are negative and much
larger in absolute value than in the benchmark regressions. Although these co-
efficients are still insignificant, their standard errors are much lower compared to
the coefficients in the benchmark specification. In levels, we find that increasing
the informal sector with one percentage point to GDP decreases the industrialized
countries’ growth rate with 0.38 percentage points. The coefficient on informality
in developing countries remains unchanged by controlling for institutional quality,
but several of the other coefficients increase considerably in absolute size and sig-
nificance. The institutional coefficients are themselves not significant and they do
not have the expected signs. Normally, we expect the coefficient on rule of law
and democracy to be positive, reflecting that improving the judicial system and
9The average GDP growth rate in developing countries is 4.25%.
10With an average growth rate of 4.25% this effect amounts to a 17% decrease of GDP per
capita growth.
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political rights of the citizens will improve growth, while the squared democracy is
normally thought to be negative, reflecting that highly democratic economies are
adversely affected by improving the political rights (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004)
since the cost of changing the political institutions outweighs the benefits.
However, the overall effect11 of the democracy variables is positive, meaning that
a move from a completely totalitarian system to a fully democratic society will
improve growth with 1.01 percentage points in (2) and 1.07 percentage points
in (6). We cannot argue in the same manner for the effect of the rule of law:
Moving from anarchy to a perfectly well functioning judicial system reduces GDP
per capita growth with something between 1.17 and 0.47 percentage points. This
makes little sense.12 However, according to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), the
rule of law has long term effects that lasts a long time. It may be that the timeframe
of analysis is to narrow to to capture such long term effects. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004) uses ten-year periods, averaging growth and comparing it across
decades, which make it possible to capture long-term effects of the independent
variables. This may also be an advantage since this averaging may remove short
term cyclical fluctuations in the macroeconomic indicators.13
7.3.2 Random effects
Running a Hausman test of specification we may determine which of the fixed or
random effects models we should use.14 For all the regression specifications we
have performed, we find that the fixed effects model should be preferred. Our
test thus contradicts Schneider (2005) that rather uses the random effects GLS
11Computed by adding the democracy variables assuming a change from 0 to 1 in the democ-
racy index.
12Arguably, the negative impact of the rule of law may be attributed to some other short term
factors that are correlated to the rule of law. Or, it may be that there is some political unrest
associated with the improvement of the judicial system, affecting the economic environment
adversely.
13See appendix C for an analysis taking the same approach as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).
14We discuss this test in appendix B.
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Fixed effects models Random effects models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Informal sector in industrialized countries 0.00086 -0.00383 -0.00075 -0.00006
(0.31) (1.50) (2.86)** (0.17)
Informal sector in developing countries -0.00422 -0.00480 -0.00053 -0.00059
(2.05)** (2.68)** (2.23)** (1.99)**
Lagged log of GDP per capita -0.11879 -0.08280 0.00128 -0.00356
(5.21)** (3.59)** (0.46) (0.92)
Openness 0.00033 0.00042 0.00013 0.00023
(1.46) (2.07)** (2.11)** (2.79)**
Inflation rate other countries -1.11e-05 -2.64e-05 -8.04e-06 -2.42e-05
(1.49) (2.07)** (1.29) (1.46)
Inflation rate transition economies -4.78e-05 -0.00053 -2.63e-05 -0.00028
(3.85)** (2.86)** (2.57)** (2.66)**
Government consumption 0.00071 0.00150 -0.00028 0.00036
(0.73) (1.72)* (0.62) (0.71)
Total population 8.93e-07 -4.90e-07 3.71e-07 4.37e-07
(0.32) (0.20) (2.41)** (2.42)**
Capital accumulation 0.06793 0.07289 0.10648 0.09167
(4.20)** (4.92)** (8.09)** (7.13)**
Rule of law -0.00468 -0.02284
(0.30) (1.92)*
Democracy -0.02726 -0.03953
(0.56) (1.15)
Squared democracy 0.03815 0.04168
(0.85) (1.29)
Constant 1.04696 0.79920 0.03262 0.07006
(4.90)** (3.85)** (1.19) (2.05)**
Observations 302 277 302 277
Number of countries 106 102 106 102
R2 (within) 0.39 0.41 0.19 0.32
F/Wald χ2 test of specification 10.67 7.84 119.28 98.73
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Hausman χ2 97.13 31.04
(0.0000) (0.0019)
Fixed effects regression and Random effects (GLS) estimation. Dependent variable is real
GDP per capita growth rate. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%. The year dummies for 1994-95 have the estimated coefficients
0.00867 (0.85), 0.01703 (1.78)*,-0.01183 (2.08)**, 0.00015 (0.03), and for 1999-2000 0.05237
(3.00)**, 0.04727 (3.06)**, 0.01261 (2.12)**, 0.00976 (1.71)*. For the fixed effects specifica-
tions the F-test of specification is reported, while the Wald χ2 is reported for the fixed effects
regressions.
Table 7.1: GDP growth and the informal sector.
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Fixed effects models Random effects models
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Informal sector in transition countries 0.00195 -0.00751 -0.00080 -0.00003
(0.42) (1.50) (2.54)** (0.09)
Informal sector in developing countries -0.00722 -0.00704 -0.00048 -0.00056
(2.43)** (2.67)** (1.66)* (1.63)
Lagged log of GDP per capita -0.10282 -0.10417 -0.00069 -0.00228
(3.11)** (3.20)** (0.19) (0.49)
Openness 0.00014 0.00029 0.00017 0.00023
(0.50) (1.11) (1.75)* (2.13)**
Inflation rate other countries -1.14e-05 -1.36e-05 -6.76e-06 -7.95e-06
(1.36) (1.88)* (0.95) (1.23)
Inflation rate transition economies -3.82e-05 -0.00057 -2.37e-05 -0.00027
(2.54)** (2.37)** (2.01)** (2.20)**
Government consumption 0.00107 0.00189 -0.00042 0.00059
(0.97) (1.86)* (0.70) (0.92)
Total population -6.30e-07 -3.94e-07 4.10e-07 4.42e-07
(0.19) (0.14) (2.31)** (2.21)**
Capital accumulation 0.06823 0.06771 0.10159 0.09297
(3.54)** (3.73)** (6.50)** (6.05)**
Rule of law -0.01173 -0.03146
(0.57) (2.03)**
Democracy -0.03280 -0.04106
(0.59) (1.04)
Squared democracy 0.04351 0.03770
(0.83) (1.00)
Constant 0.96486 1.03200 0.04438 0.05838
(3.19)** (3.55)** (1.34) (1.49)
Observations 225 204 225 204
Number of countries 80 77 80 77
R2 (within) 0.43 0.44 0.20 0.33
F/Wald χ2 test of specification 9.08 6.24 78.66 65.96
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Hausman χ2 68.72 50.25
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Fixed effects regression and Random effects (GLS) estimation. Dependent variable is real
GDP per capita growth rate. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%. The year dummies for 1994-95 have the estimated coefficients
0.02000 (1.47), 0.03121 (2.37)**, -0.01123 (1.51), 0.00575 (0.74), and for 1999-2000 0.07334
(2.90)**, 0.07326 (3.19)**, 0.01465 (1.89)*, 0.01427 (1.85)*. For the fixed effects specifica-
tions the F-test of specification is reported, while the Wald χ2 is reported for the fixed effects
regressions.
Table 7.2: GDP growth and the informal sector. Without the high-income coun-
tries.
7.3 Results 59
1990-91 1994-95 1999-2000
Informal sector in industrialized countries -0.00308 -0.00217 0.00076
(5.00)** (4.11)** (2.84)**
Informal sector in transition countries -0.00404 -0.00257 0.00079
(5.62)** (4.04)** (2.53)**
Informal sector in developing countries -0.00128 -0.00075 -0.00047 -0.00059 0.00003 0.00005
(2.67)** (1.33) (1.11) (1.19) (0.11) (0.16)
Table 7.3: GDP growth and the informal sector. 1990-2000.
model. This is quite surprising since we find that the country specific effects are
closely correlated with the regressors, and since the results of our random effects
regressions are quite different from the results of Schneider (2005):
• All informal sector coefficients are negative, clearly contradicting Schneider
(2005). The level of the informal sector’s influence is also quite smaller in all
specifications compared to both the fixed effects regressions and even more
compared to the random effects results in Schneider (2005).
• In the regressions including the institutional variables, we find that the effect
of the informal sector becomes insignificant in the high-income countries (in
(4) and (8)) and also in developing countries in (8).
• In column (3), we see that the coefficient on lagged GDP is positive; thus
contradicting the convergence hypothesis. The other coefficients have the
expected signs.
7.3.3 OLS regression for each period
To further the analysis we separate our data into the three time periods and run
OLS on them. The results are presented in table 7.3 where we only report the
coefficients on the relative size of the informal sector. The results differs little
from the regressions including institutional variables.15
Using the benchmark specification for the period 1990-91 we find that the informal
15Not reported
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sector has a negative effect on the GDP per capita growth in general. The results
are most pronounced for the industrialized and transition groups, showing that a
one percentage point increase of the relative size of the informal sector leads to
about 0.3 percentage points reduced growth. Including the high-income countries
we find that the effect of the informal sector is about 0.1 percentage points in
developing countries.
In 1994-95 the coefficients on the informal sector are still negative. The abso-
lute levels of the coefficients are generally smaller. The coefficients on developing
country informality are now insignificant independent on whether we include the
high-income countries or not.
Looking at the results for the OLS regressions in 1999-2000 the results have
changed. Although most coefficients are smaller, they are now positive, indicating
a positive effect of increasing informality worldwide. The effect of the informal
sector in “industrialized” countries is at 0.0008 percentage points (both with and
without high-income countries). The effect of informality on growth in developing
countries is close to zero.
7.4 Critical remarks
How can we explain that the informal sector influences growth negatively at the
beginning of the last decade and positively at the end of it? As we have already
argued, there are many effects of informality; some being positive and others neg-
ative. Determining which of these effect that are determining the overall effect
on growth is difficult to tell based on the relatively crude analysis we provide
here. Furthermore, informality may proxy other important effects on growth not
taken account of in our specification. Such effects may be both positive and neg-
ative.
As previously discussed, business cycles may affect our results and disguise oth-
erwise significant relationships. GDP (per capita) growth rates are quite volatile,
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Figure 7.1: GDP per capita growth rate 1976-2005.
Yearly data. Source: World Bank (WDI).
and it may be argued that we should rather use long-term growth as a dependent
variable in our analysis, instead of using yearly data. In figure 7.1 we display
GDP growth for high-income countries and low to medium income countries. The
data that we use in our analysis is marked at the time of observation. We see
that averaging over e.g. decades or 5-year periods would produce quite different
growth data, and could possibly give a better indication of the long-term tenden-
cies (of development). It is conceivable that this kind of data would respond quite
differently to changes in the size of the informal sector. There is, after all, more
support from researchers of the notion of the mostly negative long term effects
of informality, such as decreasing productivity, lower tax morality and reduced
support of the government by the citizens.
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Another important weakness of our analysis is the general weakness inherent to
cross-country comparative analysis. One problem is that we have few observations;
and although we have over a hundred countries in three periods in our data set,
it would improve the statistical properties of our analysis profoundly if we had
a thousand countries over several decades. Furthermore, establishing macroeco-
nomic relationships in a cross-country context is difficult, especially in our case
where we look at the informal sector that arguably is differing widely between
countries, not only in size but also in nature. The types of individuals that engage
in informal activities differs, the kind of activities they engage in differs, their mo-
tives and incentives for entering the informal sector differs, and the governments
respond to these agents and activities differently. The effect that informality has
on growth will naturally differ between countries and these effects will not be
exposed properly in a cross-country analysis.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
How does informality affect development? According to our estimates the informal
sector seems to slow GDP growth in developing countries, where a one percentage
point increase in the informal sector to GDP leads to 0.42 percentage points lower
GDP growth. The effect of informality is less clear in developed and transition
countries where we fail to uncover any significant effects of informality. The esti-
mated impact of a one percentage point increase in the informal sector relative to
GDP is 0.086 percentage points higher GDP growth. This effect becomes nega-
tive when we account for the influence of institutional quality. We conclude that
informality seems to be negative for growth in developing countries, but not in
high-income and transition economies where informality does not seem to influ-
ence growth significantly. This contradicts the reported results in Schneider (2005)
where informality is found to promote growth significantly in both high-income and
transition economies.
Considering that the effects of informality are likely to be worse in the long term,
we believe that it is an important issue that should be taken seriously. The increase
of the informal sector that we see all over the world should therefore be addressed
by economists and researchers in other fields of science. We will however not
make any recommendations to policy-makers since our results are based on the
highly controversial MIMIC estimates that are too uncertain to be trusted blindly.
64 Conclusion
The methods applied to measure the size and extent of informality is still at
its infancy, and without further development in this line of research we should
question whether such measurements have any practical purpose besides creating
debate and sensational headlines. It is also important to emphasize that without
a general theory on how informality or the informal sector works with the formal
economy, we cannot put these results in perspective.
Appendix A
Variables description and data
All variables except the shadow economy, democracy and rule of law are obtained from
the World Development Index (WDI) database. The sources of the WDI data are stated
below.
GDP per capita on PPP basis
GDP per capita is based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic
product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the US dollar has in
the United States. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets
or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current dollars.
Source: World Bank, International Comparison Programme database.
Lagged log of GDP per capita
Computed using the GDP per capita data.
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Source: World Bank, International Comparison Programme database; own calcula-
tion.
Annual GDP per capita growth rate
Computed using the GDP per capita data for the observed 109 countries over the years
1988 to 2000. A lagged GDP growth variable is also computed.
Source: World Bank, International Comparison Programme database; own calcula-
tion.
Informal sector
The variable Informal sector (or shadow economy) is defined as the share of the infor-
mal sector to the official GDP. The estimations for the size of the informal sector are
undertaken using the DYMIMIC and the currency demand approaches. This variable is
available for three points in time; in 1990/1991, 1994/1995 and 1999/2000.
Source: Schneider (2005).
Informal sector industrialized countries
The variable Informal sector industrialized countries has the value 0 if a country is a
developing country [indicated by the value 0 in the dummy industrialized countries] and
the value of the informal sector as a percentage of GDP if a country is an industrialized
country [indicated by the value 1 in the Dummy Industrialized Countries] or a transition
country [indicated by the value 1 in the Dummy Transition Countries].
Source: Own calculation.
Informal sector developing countries
The variable Informal sector developing countries has the value 0 if a country is an
industrialized country [indicated by the value 1 in the Dummy industrialized country] or
a transition country [indicated by the value 1 in the dummy transition country] and the
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value of the informal sector as a percentage of GDP if a country is a developing country
[indicated by the value 0 in the dummy industrialized country].
Source: Own calculation.
Openness
Openness is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share
of gross domestic product.
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Inflation rate, GDP deflator
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator, which
shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole. The GDP implicit deflator is
the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local currency.
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Inflation rate other countries
Inflation rate other countries is defined as inflation rate but has the value 0 if a country
is a transition country [indicated by the value 1 in the transition countries dummy] and
the value of the inflation rate if a country is a non-transition country [indicated by the
value 0 in the transition countries dummy].
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files;
own calculation.
Inflation rate transition countries
Inflation rate transition countries is defined as inflation rate but has the value 0 if a
country is a non-transition country [indicated by the value 0 in the transition countries
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dummy] and the value of the inflation rate if a country is a transition country [indicated
by the value 1 in the transition countries dummy].
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files;
own calculation.
Government consumption
Government consumption is defined as general government final consumption expendi-
ture and includes all government current expenditures for purchases of goods and services
(including compensation of employees). It also includes most expenditure on national
defence and security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of
government capital formation.
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Total population in millions
Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship; except for refugees not permanently
settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of
their country of origin.
Source: World Bank staff estimates from various sources including census reports, the
United Nations Statistics Division’s Population and Vital Statistics Report, country
statistical offices, and Demographic and Health Surveys from national sources and Macro
International.
Gross capital formation
Gross capital formation (GCF; formerly gross domestic investment) consists of outlays
on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of invento-
ries. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant,
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the
like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial
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and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary
or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and “work in progress.” According to
the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered capital formation. GCF
data are in current U.S. dollars.
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Capital accumulation rate
The Capital Accumulation Rate is the annual growth rate of gross capital formation.
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files;
own calculation.
Investment ratio
The Investment ratio is the share of gross capital formation to GDP.
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files;
own calculation.
Terms of trade adjustment
Definition: The terms of trade effect equals capacity to import less exports of goods and
services in constant prices. Data are in constant local currency.
Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
Total fertility rate
Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would be born to a woman
if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance
with current age-specific fertility rates.
Source: World Bank staff estimates from various sources including census reports, the
United Nations Statistics Division’s Population and Vital Statistics Report, country
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statistical offices, and Demographic and Health Surveys from national sources and Macro
International.
Reciprocal of life expectancy
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if
prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout
its life.
Source: World Bank staff estimates from various sources including census reports, the
United Nations Statistics Division’s Population and Vital Statistics Report, country
statistical offices, and Demographic and Health Surveys from national sources and Macro
International.
Rule of law
The Law and Order variable comes from a subjective measure provided in the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide that is published by Political Risk Services (PRS). The
underlying data is tabulated into seven categories, which has been adjusted to a zero-
to-one scale, with one representing the most favourable environment for maintenance of
the rule of law.
Source: The PRS Group; own calculation.
Political rights, democracy
The Democracy variable comes from a subjective measure provided by Freedom House.
The underlying data are tabulated into seven categories, which has been adjusted to
a zero-to-one scale, with one representing a fully representative democracy and zero a
complete totalitarian system.
Source: Freedom House; own calculation.
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Squared democracy
The squared Democracy variable allows for non-linear effects of the democracy vari-
able.
Source: Freedom House; own calculation.
Dummy high-income countries
The variable dummy high-income countries is a binary variable that takes the value 0
if a country is a developing country and 1 if the country is a high-income country. A
country is defined to be in this group if it is in the high-income group defined by the
World Bank Indicators (of 2002) as having a per capita income of USD 9266 or more.
Countries with per capita income of USD 9265 or less are defined as developing.
Source: World Bank.
Dummy developing countries
The variable dummy developing countries is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if
a country is a developing country and 0 if the country is not.
Source: Own calculation.
Dummy transition countries
The variable dummy transition countries is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a
country is a transition country from a centrally planned economy to a market economy
and 0 if the country is not. We note that only Slovenia is included in both the transition
and “industrialized” (high-income) group.
Source: Own calculation.
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Dummy industrialized countries
The variable dummy industrialized countries is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if
a country is a high-income or transition country and 0 if the country is developing.
Source: Own calculation.
Year dummies
These are dummy variables for the periods 1994-95 and 1999-2000.
Source: Own calculation.
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Informal sector GDP per capita GDP per capita growth
Country 90/91 94/95 99/00 90/91 94/95 99/00 90/91 94/95 99/00
Albania 32.6 30.6 33.4 2228 2447 3550 -0.153 0.111 0.108
Algeria 28.7 31.9 34.1 4448 4494 5328 0.017 0.024 0.037
Argentina 22.1 24.8 25.4 7837 10454 12154 0.046 0.025 -0.013
Armenia 43.8 44.3 46.3 2551 1618 2320 0.063 0.074
Australia 10.1 13.5 14.3 16854 20188 25058 0.024 0.056 0.034
Austria 6.9 8.6 9.8 19414 22699 28261 0.070 0.048 0.052
Azerbajan 50.3 57.4 60.6 1771 2374 -0.149 0.134
Bangladesh 28.4 32.4 35.6 1007 1192 1437 0.062 0.042 0.032
Belarus 44.2 46 48.1 4394 3348 4629 0.030 -0.090 0.070
Belgium 19.3 21.5 22.2 19243 21694 26523 0.056 0.044 0.053
Benin 39.6 42.3 45.2 706 792 938 0.036 0.032 0.04
Bolivia 55.4 60.4 67.1 1778 2041 2364 0.059 0.043 0.016
Bosnia and Herzegovina 28.3 31.9 34.1 1758 5111 0.077
Botswana 27.6 30.9 33.4 4560 5348 7336 0.03 0.081 0.122
Brazil 32.5 36.4 39.8 5373 6250 7143 0.000 0.052 0.033
Bulgaria 29.4 33.2 36.9 5630 5376 5683 -0.003 0.057 0.072
Burkina Faso 31.9 35.4 38.4 760 843 994 0.042 0.019 0.031
Cameroon 25.9 28.7 32.8 1656 1516 1829 -0.021 0.002 0.043
Canada 12.8 14.8 16 18644 21297 26550 0.012 0.05 0.06
Chile 13.6 16.4 19.8 5011 7030 8853 0.069 0.087 0.031
China 10.5 12 13.1 1378 2367 3758 0.088 0.138 0.088
Colombia 33.4 36.2 39.1 4983 5790 6110 0.055 0.048 0.000
Costa Rica 22 24.2 26.2 5278 6501 8727 0.018 0.036 0.074
Cote d’Ivoire 33.4 36.2 39.9 1463 1400 1601 -0.009 0.012 -0.009
Croatia 28.4 30.4 33.4 7654 6595 9131 -0.004 0.077 0.050
Czech Republic 15.9 17.2 19.1 11352 12311 14907 0.062 0.049
Denmark 10.8 17.8 18 19981 23040 27935 0.047 0.056 0.048
Dominican Republic 28.4 30.4 32.1 3442 4320 6176 -0.005 0.047 0.082
Ecuador 28.9 31.4 34.4 2908 3036 3298 0.038 0.027 0.006
Egypt 30.5 32.4 35.1 2374 2728 3499 0.049 0.038 0.059
Ethiopia 33.7 37.4 40.3 609 640 762 -0.032 0.03 0.052
Finland 13.4 18.2 18.1 18010 18992 24727 0.004 0.043 0.053
France 9 14.5 15.2 18291 20705 24970 0.047 0.044 0.048
Georgia 57.8 62.4 67.3 3349 1271 1822 -0.145 0.015 0.061
Germany 11.8 13.5 16 17881 20939 24856 0.087 0.046 0.043
Ghana 32.9 35.4 38.4 1325 1540 1852 0.049 0.032 0.041
Greece 22.6 28.6 28.7 12194 13349 16830 0.035 0.033 0.064
Guatemala 41.4 45.9 51.5 2801 3302 3910 0.042 0.043 0.034
Table A.1: Data on the informal sector, real GDP per capita and GDP growth.
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Informal sector GDP per capita GDP per capita growth
Country 90/91 94/95 99/00 90/91 94/95 99/00 90/91 94/95 99/00
Honduras 40.7 44.3 49.6 2072 2318 2447 0.032 0.029 0.005
Hong Kong 11.9 13.4 16.6 17244 21288 24542 0.074 0.044 0.086
Hungary 21.4 23.9 25.1 9037 9274 12496 -0.045 0.049 0.068
India 20.6 21.8 23.1 1406 1770 2367 0.052 0.077 0.058
Indonesia 15.4 17.6 19.4 2055 2654 2960 0.167 0.081 0.039
Iran 13.7 16.8 18.9 3994 4820 5672 0.129 0.026 0.033
Ireland 11 15.4 15.9 13004 16806 29044 0.080 0.100 0.127
Israel 16.3 18.9 21.9 15220 18801 22863 0.059 0.071 0.054
Italy 22.8 26 27.1 18292 20828 24358 0.058 0.044 0.040
Jamaica 31.4 33.2 36.4 3182 3473 3610 0.09 0.034 0.024
Japan 8.8 10.6 11.2 19878 22629 25662 0.078 0.033 0.028
Jordan 15.4 17.1 19.4 3110 3666 3942 -0.003 0.032 0.022
Kazakhstan 33.7 38.4 43.2 4415 3407 4273 -0.011 -0.067 0.117
Kenya 28.4 31.2 34.3 945 965 1018 0.041 0.012 0.010
Korea 22.3 24.9 27.5 8482 11957 15514 0.121 0.099 0.095
Kyrgyz Republic 32.4 36.1 39.8 1934 1145 1509 0.008 -0.106 0.059
Latvia 32.5 36.3 39.9 7291 5148 7533 -0.066 0.041 0.089
Lebanon 27.4 30.4 34.1 2414 3738 4356 0.459 0.056 0.005
Lithuania 24.7 27.1 30.3 9226 6046 8498 -0.003 0.034
Madagascar 32.4 35.8 39.6 766 753 806 -0.015 0.005 0.034
Malawi 33.5 37 40.3 436 477 584 0.071 0.048 0.012
Malaysia 25.1 27.4 31.1 4775 6765 8508 0.100 0.088 0.087
Mali 32.7 36.9 41 563 626 772 0.038 0.040 0.035
Mexico 24.1 27.1 30.1 6388 7180 8740 0.059 0.003 0.053
Moldova 36.4 41.7 45.1 2839 1395 1299 -0.061 -0.135 0.017
Mongolia 16.2 17.1 18.4 1457 1338 1586 0.052 0.008 0.035
Morocco 29.8 32.7 36.4 2850 3030 3514 0.067 0.020 0.010
Mozambique 35.9 38.1 40.3 567 627 865 0.035 0.041 0.047
Nepal 31.7 35.2 38.4 877 1072 1287 0.067 0.055 0.047
Netherlands 11.9 13.7 13.1 19330 21991 27971 0.069 0.038 0.038
New Zealand 9.2 11.3 12.8 13438 16396 19229 0.026 0.051 0.058
Nicaragua 40.1 43.2 45.2 2638 2802 3213 0.043 -0.036 0.053
Niger 32.2 37.4 41.9 686 673 713 0.023 0.027 -0.027
Nigeria 46.7 51.5 57.9 732 780 839 0.075 -0.011 0.032
Norway 14.8 18.2 19.1 21667 26577 33531 0.064 0.058 0.037
Pakistan 28.2 31.4 36.8 1325 1616 1872 0.065 0.039 0.043
Panama 51.4 58.2 64.1 3984 4882 6100 0.112 0.026 0.034
Peru 47.1 52.3 59.9 3248 4055 4642 -0.035 0.108 0.023
Table A.1 continued.
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Country 90/91 94/95 99/00 90/91 94/95 99/00 90/91 94/95 99/00
Philippines 37.2 40.1 43.4 3156 3365 3890 0.012 0.042 0.050
Poland 21.3 24.3 27.6 6041 7140 10056 0.081 0.064
Portugal 15.9 22.1 22.7 11999 13543 17738 0.075 0.044 0.055
Romania 26.2 30.6 34.4 5196 5462 5776 0.080 0.022
Russian Federation 37.5 41.3 46.1 8207 5902 6749 -0.006 -0.064 0.094
Saudi Arabia 14.2 16 18.4 10035 11415 12035 0.112 0.006 0.019
Senegal 35.1 39.1 43.2 1154 1201 1415 0.021 0.034 0.043
Serbia and Montenegro 21.9 25.8 29.1
Singapore 9.8 11.2 13.1 12533 17403 22277 0.086 0.075 0.108
Slovak Republic 14.3 16.2 18.9 8436 8306 11052 -0.053 0.077 0.042
Slovenia 21.5 24.3 27.1 12066 16350 0.053 0.066
South Africa 22.1 24.2 28.4 8166 8394 9314 0.005 0.030 0.026
Spain 16.1 22.4 22.7 14290 16401 20794 0.068 0.045 0.053
Sri Lanka 36.2 40.1 44.6 1998 2564 3431 0.078 0.062 0.084
Sweden 15.8 19.5 19.2 18389 20273 25139 0.037 0.046 0.059
Switzerland 6.7 7.8 8.6 25065 26779 29576 0.046 0.021 0.028
Syria 12.8 16.2 19.3 2206 2840 3226 0.080 0.039 -0.015
Tanzania 45.6 51.3 58.3 439 443 509 0.047 0.008 0.041
Thailand 43.2 47.3 52.6 3919 5683 6137 0.124 0.101 0.044
Tunisia 30.9 33.6 38.4 3818 4637 6066 0.069 0.026 0.062
Turkey 26.3 29.4 32.1 4540 5207 6264 0.070 0.008 0.022
Uganda 37.2 40.1 43.1 740 918 1208 0.064 0.075 0.067
Ukraine 43.3 47.3 52.2 6754 4124 3929 -0.044 -0.156 0.063
United Arab Emirates 19.8 22.7 26.4 19606 19420 20727 0.062 0.026 0.025
United Kingdom 9.6 12.5 12.7 17979 20857 25866 0.031 0.054 0.047
United States 6.7 8.8 8.7 23398 27430 33351 0.035 0.038 0.041
Uruguay 41.3 45.3 51.1 6007 7594 8786 0.039 0.043 -0.011
Uzbekistan 27.3 30.1 34.1 1235 1478 -0.031 0.050
Venezuela 27.4 30.4 33.6 4911 5560 5584 0.071 0.005 -0.020
Vietnam 10.9 12.3 15.6 1019 1367 1941 0.105 0.079 0.061
Yemen 20.7 23.4 27.4 526 673 772 0.073 0.046
Zambia 40.7 44.3 48.9 800 723 760 0.012 -0.066 0.016
Zimbabwe 47.3 53.4 59.4 2279 2389 2600 0.075 0.053 -0.065
Table A.1 continued.

Appendix B
Panel data models
Consider the following general regression model:1
yit = x′itβ + z
′
iα+ εit
The x′it consist of K regressors, but no constant term. The z′iα is called the heterogeneity
or individual effect and contains a constant term and a set of individual (or in our case
country) specific variables that are constant over time. These variables may be observed,
such as age, sex, location, etc., or they may be unobserved, such as individual skills and
preferences. If all these variables are observed for all units of observation, the model
may be treated as an ordinary linear model and the parameters may be estimated by
least squares (OLS). If the individual effect term only consists of a constant, OLS is an
efficient and consistent estimator of the slopes and constant. In this case we could use
what is called pooled regression. If, however, there are unobserved variables in zi, we
need to use other methods to estimate the general model. For this reason we use so-
called unobserved variable models to estimate the model. There are two types of models,
random and fixed effects models, and we choose from them depending on whether the
unobserved individual effects are correlated with the other regressors or not.2
1For this appendix we refer to Greene (2003).
2The names of these models can be quite misleading; one may get the impression that the
random effects model is the most plausible one since it allows for a “random” individual specific
disturbance.
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B.1 Fixed effects
If the individual (unobserved) effects are correlated (which is plausible in most cases),
we may use the fixed effects model:
yit = x′itβ + αi + εit
In this model all unobserved and observed time-constant effects are put into the term
αi = z′iα, which is the individual specific constant term. This form of modelling is
equivalent to adding a dummy variable for each observational unit. The benefit of
this model is that we do not have to make the strong assumption that the individual
effects are not correlated with the regressors. The downside is that we cannot include
typical observable individual data that are constant over time since this will lead to
perfect collinearity. Furthermore, the number of parameters to be estimated is often
very large (one dummy coefficient for each individual or group), thereby reducing the
degrees of freedom considerably (this is therefore one of the advantages of the random
effects model). We define the matrix D = [d1 d2 . . .d− n] where di denotes the dummy
variable vector for the ith unit. The fixed effects model may be then be written as
y = Xβ + Dα+ ε
This model is also called the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) model and is based
upon the same assumptions as OLS. The slopes estimator may be written as follows:
b = (X ′MDX)−1X ′MDy
Where the data transforming matrix MD is defined as
MD = I −D(D′D)−1D′
B.2 Random effects 79
B.2 Random effects
Assuming that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the regressors we may express
the general model in the following way:
yit = x′itβ + E[z
′
iα] + {z′iα− E[z′iα]} + εit
= x′itβ + α+ ui + εit
This is a regression model with a compound disturbance, where ui = {z′iα − E[z′iα]}
is the individual specific random element (but constant over time) and α is the mean
of the unobserved heterogeneity. Running OLS on this model will produce consistent
but inefficient estimates. To estimate this model we have to apply (feasible) generalized
least squares. We have the following underlying assumptions for the random effects
model:
E[εit|X] = E[ui|X] = 0,
E[ε2it|X] = σ2ε ,
E[u2it|X] = σ2u,
E[εituj |X] = 0 for all i, t, and j,
E[εitεjs|X] = 0 if t "= s or i "= j,
E[uiuj |X] = 0 if t "= s,
Denoting the composite disturbance as nit = εit + ui and substituting it into the model,
we get the “error components model” which have the assumptions
E[n2it|X] = σ2ε + σ2u,
E[nitnis|X] = σ2u, t "= s
E[nitnjs|X] = 0 for all t and s if i "= j,
We now let Σ = E[nin′i|X] which on matrix form is
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Σ =

σ2ε + σ2u σ2u σ2u . . . σ2u
σ2u σ
2
ε + σ2u σ2u σ2u
... ... . . . ...
σ2u σ
2
u σ
2
u . . . σ
2
ε + σ2u

This is the covariance matrix for the ith unit. For the whole nT data set (n individu-
als/units T time periods) we then get the covariance matrix
Ω =

Σ 0 . . . 0
0 Σ 0
... . . . ...
0 0 . . . Σ

The GLS estimator may then be applied to obtain the slopes parameters:
βˆ = (X ′Ω−1X)−1X ′Ω−1y
B.3 Which model should we choose?
Hausman (1978) has developed a test that examines whether there are systematic dif-
ferences in the estimated coefficients of the fixed and random effect models. If there are
systematic differences in the estimates, we can conclude that the random effects model
is inconsistent since there has to be correlation between the individual effects and the
regressors to ensure such systematic differences. If there is no systematic difference in
the estimates, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no correlation between the
individual unobserved effects and the regressors. The test statistic is based upon the
covariance matrix of the difference vector [b − βˆ]. Hausman (1978) finds that “the co-
variance of an efficient estimator with its difference from an inefficient estimator is zero”,
thus we may write the covariance matrix as follows:
V ar[b− βˆ] = V ar[b]− V ar[βˆ] = Ψ
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(b) (βˆ) (b-βˆ)
q
diag(Ψˆ
−1
)
infind .0008598 -.0007473 .0016071 .0027925
infdev -.0042164 -.0005299 -.0036865 .0020455
lalngdp -.1187871 .001282 -.1200691 .0226069
open .0003305 .0001292 .0002014 .0002176
inflrest -.0000111 -8.04e-06 -3.09e-06 4.11e-06
infltran -.0000478 -.0000263 -.0000215 7.01e-06
gov .0007062 -.000281 .0009872 .0008578
pop 8.93e-11 3.71e-11 5.22e-11 2.80e-10
caac .0679291 .1064775 -.0385484 .0093775
yr95 .0086721 -.0118309 .020503 .0085327
yr00 .0523723 .0126102 .0397621 .0163847
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from fixed effects
βˆ = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from
random effects
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
χ2(9) = (b− βˆ)′Ψˆ−1(b− βˆ)
= 97.13
Prob > χ2 = 0.0000
Table B.1: Hausman test of specification.
The chi-squared test is based on the Wald criterion,
W = χ2[K − 1] = [b− βˆ]′Ψˆ−1[b− βˆ]
and under the null hypothesis the test statistic has a chi-squared distribution with K-1
degrees of freedom. Consider the test of specification reported in table B.1 performed on
our benchmark specification.3 With 10 degrees of freedom we have a critical χ2-value of
18.31 at conventional levels of significance, which is far less than the reported statistic.
Thus we may reject the null hypothesis that the models do not differ systematically, and
we choose the fixed effects model.
3I.e. this is a test of which of the regressions (1) and (3) we should prefer.

Appendix C
Extended econometric analysis
C.1 Schneider’s (2005) approach
This approach is the same as we take in chapter 7, except that we now include the
lagged growth variable instead of the lagged GDP to use the exact same specification as
Schneider (2005). A few points are worth noting here:
• According to the Hausman test we find that the fixed effects model is the most
appropriate one. This contradicts the result of the Hausman test performed by
Schneider (2005).
• In the fixed effects regressions the estimated coefficients for the informal sector
are positive in all regressions (9), (10), (13) and (14) except for the coefficients in
developing countries when we take account of the institutional variables.
• Including the institutional variables in the fixed effects model renders the impact
of informality in high-income economies smaller and insignificant. The effect of
informality in developing countries is insignificant in all the fixed effects regressions
regardless.
• In the random effects regressions the effect of informality is negative for GDP
growth in all specifications (i.e. in (11), (12), (15) and (16)). The significance of
these coefficients varies.
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• Contrary to the results found in our original analysis, we find that the effect of
improving the institutional quality is significant in most cases. The signs of these
variables are mostly of the unexpected kind, and the overall effect of the democracy
variables are negative in three out of four cases. The rule of law variable is mostly
significant, and is negative in all cases.
• Contrary to our original analysis, we find here that most of the constants are
negative. This is probably due to the large effect that the lagged growth has on
the results.
This brings us to the rather surprising conclusion that the results presented here are even
more different from the results reported in Schneider (2005) than our original results.
This applies to the results of both the fixed and random effects regressions.
C.2 Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (2004) approach
At the outset, the empirical strategy involved taking two paths. The first approach was to
replicate and extend the specifications made by Schneider (2005), the other was to follow
the recommended strategy presented by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). Knowing that
this approach is the basis of Schneider’s (2005) econometric growth model, we expected
to find quite similar results, but there are some significant differences. Schneider (2005)
has excluded some seemingly important variables, and we took on the same approach
as Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) to find out if there were any differences compared to
the analysis of Schneider (2005). One issue was why Schneider (2005) has not included
the so-called institutional variables (such as democracy and rule of law).
Barro and Sala-i-Martin’s (2004) “benchmark” specification:
Growth in per capita GDP =
log of per capita GDP + male gross secondary school attainment + reciprocal of life
expectancy at birth + log of fertility rate + government consumption ratio + rule of
law + democracy + democracy squared + openness ratio + change in terms of trade +
investment ratio + inflation rate + year dummies
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Fixed effects models Random effects models
(9) (10) (11) (12)
Informal sector in industrialized countries 0.00646 0.00181 -0.00033 -0.00012
(3.79)** (0.93) (1.82)* (0.49)
Informal sector in developing countries 0.00074 -0.00061 -0.00023 -0.00032
(0.56) (0.46) (1.70)* (1.65)*
Lagged GDP per capita growth rate 0.74108 0.68882 0.71078 0.69104
(15.72)** (12.60)** (17.57)** (15.39)**
Openness 0.00056 0.00049 0.00012 0.00016
(3.71)** (3.24)** (2.84)** (2.66)**
Inflation rate other countries 6.77e-06 3.27e-06 1.22e-05 1.06e-05
(1.34) (0.67) (2.76)** (2.48)**
Inflation rate transition economies 2.82e-05 -0.00014 2.44e-05 -0.00010
(3.32)** (0.92) (3.26)** (1.35)
Government consumption 0.00134 0.00191 0.00012 0.00043
(2.08)** (2.97)** (0.37) (1.19)
Total population -6.93e-07 -1.03e-06 1.31e-07 1.54e-07
(0.39) (0.60) (1.18) (1.20)
Capital accumulation 0.08007 0.07817 0.07413 0.07147
(7.95)** (7.49)** (8.09)** (7.53)**
Year dummy 1995 -0.00733 0.00533 0.00563 0.01314
(1.24) (0.83) (1.42) (3.11)**
Year dummy 2000 0.00058 0.01351 0.02274 0.02403
(0.06) (1.45) (5.69)** (5.66)**
Rule of law -0.01755 -0.02666
(1.52) (3.14)**
Democracy -0.08148 -0.04556
(2.28)** (1.82)*
Democracy squared 0.08775 0.04242
(2.65)** (1.82)*
Constant -0.12451 -0.03805 -0.00398 0.01035
(3.03)** (0.90) (0.48) (0.93)
Observations 299 275 299 275
Countries 106 102 106 102
R2 (within) 0.71 0.68 0.64 0.64
Wald χ2 40.00 24.28 521.48 416.39
F-Test (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Hausman χ2 52.30 34.81
(0.0000) (0.0005)
Random effects GLS and fixed effects estimation. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita
growth rate. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (z statistics for the random effects
regressions). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. For the random effects specifications
Wald χ2 is reported, while F-tests of specification are reported for the fixed effects regressions.
Table C.1: Schneider approach.
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Fixed effects models Random effects models
(13) (14) (15) (16)
Informal sector in transition countries 0.00791 0.00127 -0.00042 -0.00021
(3.19)** (0.30) (1.90)* (0.76)
Informal sector in developing countries 0.00011 -0.00095 -0.00028 -0.00040
(0.06) (0.48) (1.46) (1.70)*
Lagged GDP per capita growth rate 0.75057 0.7371 0.73845 0.72476
(12.85)** (10.62)** (15.41)** (13.27)**
Openness 0.00056 0.00048 0.00015 0.00019
(3.05)** (2.47)** (2.23)** (2.54)**
Inflation rate other countries 7.20e-06 4.26e-06 1.27e-05 1.16e-05
(1.28) (0.75) (2.56)** (2.36)**
Inflation rate transition economies 3.06e-05 -0.0001 2.77e-05 -8.53e-05
(3.23)** (0.40) (3.24)** (0.95)
Government consumption 0.00135 0.00200 0.00017 0.00050
(1.87)* (2.64)** (0.40) (1.11)
Total population -9.50e-07 -1.06e-06 1.21e-07 1.31e-07
(0.46) (0.53) (0.96) (0.94)
Capital accumulation 0.08046 0.07902 0.07255 0.07109
(6.88)** (6.25)** (6.77)** (6.29)**
Year dummy 1995 -0.00345 0.00931 0.0040 0.01405
(0.42) (1.04) (0.78) (2.46)**
Year dummy 2000 0.00614 0.02015 0.0217 0.02611
(0.43) (1.39) (4.17)** (4.61)**
Rule of law -0.02716 -0.03255
(1.79)* (2.95)**
Democracy -0.08803 -0.0461
(2.10)** (1.62)
Democracy squared -0.09250 0.04087
(2.35)** (1.51)
Constant -0.10896 -0.0099 -0.00417 0.01149
(1.66) (0.14) (0.40) (0.89)
Observations 222 202 222 202
Countries 80 77 80 77
R2 (within) 0.73 0.69 0.66 0.66
Wald χ2 32.86 18.02 380.79 295.6
F-Test (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Hausman χ2 47.54 33.99
(0.0000) (0.0007)
Random effects GLS and fixed effects estimation. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita
growth rate. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (z statistics for the random effects
regressions). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. For the random effects specifications
Wald χ2 is reported, while F-tests of specification are reported for the fixed effects regressions.
Table C.2: Schneider approach. Without the high-income group.
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A few more extensions were made to the econometric model proposed by Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (2004):
• We run regressions with random and fixed effects.
• The informal sector variable is included.
• We make the same distinction between the informal sector in industrialized (high-
income) countries and developing (non-high-income) countries, and later between
transition (former centrally planned economies) and developing (non-high-income
and non-transition) countries as in Schneider (2005).
There are some important differences in the data and specification here compared to the
empirical treatment in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004):
• The government consumption ratio (that is measured by the share of general gov-
ernment final consumption expenditure to GDP) does not exclude the expenditure
on defence and education as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), since this type of
expenditure data is not available for the relevant time periods or countries of
observation.
• Male upper-level schooling is not readily used in our regression. This is due to
the lack of data on school attainment in developing countries. We have data on
male gross secondary school attainment for the years 1991 and 2000. Leaving this
variable out of the specification might improve the fit of the model.
• In the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) specification the reciprocal of life expectancy
at age one is used. Data on this variable is not available to us, thus the life
expectancy at birth is used.
• Change in terms of trade is defined in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) as the growth
rate of the terms of trade (export prices relative to import prices) multiplied by
the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP (i.e. the openness ratio). Since price
data is not available we use the terms of trade adjustment variable from the WDI
databank of the World Bank. This variable is defined as the capacity to import
less exports of goods and services in constant prices (measured in constant local
currency).
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• The investment ratio is also from Penn World Tables and is therefore expressed
in real terms. Our measure of investment is gross capital formation (World Bank
national accounts data) which is based on current US$.
• One big difference is of course that Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) looks at dif-
ferent time periods, i.e. 1965-75, 75-85 and 85-95. This may not constitute much
problems per se, but the time periods are longer, making it less likely that the
estimates are distorted by short or medium term cyclical fluctuations.
• Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) does not use random or fixed effects estimation,
but applies the method of three stage least squares (3SLS), which is a instrumental
variable method. This point is especially important since the specification is not
made to fit the fixed or random effects models and may thus not be appropriate
in our approach.
The result of this approach is reported in table C.3. We comment on the most important
findings:
• The coefficient on the informal sector is negative in all groups and regressions.
The coefficient on developing country informality is significant in all regressions
except in the last one. In the fixed effects regressions only the informal sector
coefficients are significant at the 10% level of confidence. In the random effects
regressions the effect of the informal sector in developing countries is insignificant
when we remove the high-income countries from the data set.
• As we have previously seen, the level of the effect of informality is larger in the
fixed effects regressions. Removing the high-income countries produces the highest
levels, where the informal sector in transition economies seems to have almost a
one-to-one (negative) relationship.
• The Hausman test determines that the fixed effects model is the appropriate re-
gression model.
• Compared to the results reported in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), several vari-
ables does not have the expected sign. These variables are government consump-
tion, the institutional variables, terms of trade and the investment ratio. The
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signs on the latter two variables are especially surprising, considering that they
are normally thought to be important determinants of growth.
• The democracy variables are insignificant and their overall effect on growth is
negative.
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Fixed effects models Random effects models
(17) (18) (19) (20)
Informal sector in industrialized countries -0.00306 -0.00090
(1.01) (2.14)**
Informal sector in transition countries -0.00929 -0.00094
(1.66) (1.93)*
Informal sector in developing countries -0.00429 -0.00771 -0.00074 -0.00040
(1.95)* (2.39)** (2.05)** (0.97)
Lagged log of GDP per capita -0.15521 -0.18963 -0.02078 -0.02897
(5.87)** (5.48)** (3.45)** (3.71)**
Reciprocal of life expectancy -0.33768 -0.66009 -2.96859 -3.78080
(0.10) (0.17) (1.72)* (1.92)*
Log of fertility rate 0.04152 0.06925 -0.04016 -0.05277
(1.06) (1.16) (3.05)** (3.08)**
Government consumption 0.00230 0.00278 0.00101 0.00136
(2.04)** (2.07)** (1.57) (1.71)*
Rule of law -0.00093 -0.00142 -0.03954 -0.04071
(0.05) (0.06) (2.70)** (2.22)**
Democracy -0.01946 -0.04160 -0.03752 -0.03220
(0.31) (0.57) (0.88) (0.66)
Squared democracy 0.00719 0.02836 0.03008 0.01783
(0.12) (0.42) (0.74) (0.38)
Openness 0.00084 0.00069 0.00027 0.00025
(3.37)** (2.20)** (2.96)** (2.12)**
Change in terms of trade -2.81e-16 -2.14e-16 -4.15e-16 -9.65e-16
(0.40) (0.24) (0.87) (1.65)*
Investment ratio -0.00190 -0.00187 -0.00024 -0.00021
(0.58) (0.50) (0.47) (0.39)
Inflation -1.53e-05 -1.60e-05 -1.02e-05 -1.03e-05
(2.00)** (1.83)* (1.52) (1.34)
Year dummy 1995 0.02459 0.04368 0.00008 -0.00139
(2.06)** (2.42)** (0.01) (0.14)
Year dummy 2000 0.06222 0.10822 -0.00300 -0.00485
(3.03)** (3.22)** (0.42) (0.49)
Constant 1.32304 1.61775 0.33139 0.41332
(5.34)** (4.89)** (4.94)** (4.90)**
Observations 257 188 257 188
Countries 98 73 98 73
R2 (within) 0.37 0.41 0.19 0.20
Wald χ2 5.74 4.66 54.60 45.66
F-Test (0.0000) (0.0153) (0.0004) (0.0001)
Hausman χ2 66.70 31.84
(0.0000) (0.0008)
Random effects GLS and fixed effects regression. Dependent variable is real GDP per capita
growth rate. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses (z statistics for the random effects
regressions). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%. For the random effects specifications
Wald χ2 is reported, while F-tests of specification are reported for the fixed effects regressions.
Table C.3: Barro and Sala-i-Martin approach.
Appendix D
GDP controversy
D.1 Problems related to the measurement of GDP
The measurement of informality is naturally controversial since it by definition is un-
observable. This makes any estimate of its magnitude fraught with uncertainty. As
should be obvious from our previous discussions, the measurement of GDP is central
to the measurement of informality. What is not so obvious is that the measurement of
GDP is also a very uncertain estimate. This is at the outset due to the challenge of
measuring the value added by all economic activities, and the statisticians that estimate
the GDP must often make simplifying assumptions to be able to compute the GDP. But
there are also other problems with this measurement that are potentially devastating for
the gathering of GDP data worldwide: Tanzi (1999) discusses the political implications
of the GDP data and how countries and politicians have strong incentives to change
the reported national GDP data. Producing strong GDP data may for instance give
the false impression that the government has successfully promoted growth with their
economic policies and may be used by the incumbent leadership to consolidate their
position in people’s opinion. At the other hand, governments may have the incentive
to reports a low GDP to qualify themselves to receive foreign aid. The overall effect of
these incentives are unknown and may go either way since governments and politicians
may have incentives to both understate or overstate the size of GDP. Considering that
the methods that estimate informality rely heavily on the precision of the GDP data
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makes the methods even more uncertain.
Another important issue to address is the fact that in response to the discrepancies
in GDP data, statisticians try to correct their data by estimating the volume of value
added from the informal sector, thereby possibly making the GDP measurement even
more uncertain. This is important for e.g. the MIMIC model that often uses GDP as an
indicator for the informal sector, meaning that one may detect changes in the informal
sector by considering its impact on (official) GDP. This may be a serious problem since
the GDP data no longer becomes a measurement of the official/formal sector when
statisticians correct their GDP data (i.e. they should also report their uncorrected
data).
An obvious problem with many estimates of informality (and many other macroeco-
nomic data) is that it is often measured relative to GDP. The uncertainty of the GDP
measurement will thus be transferred to the informality measurement. Furthermore,
this unit of measurement may vary with informality, depending on whether the official
GDP includes the whole informal sector value added or not.
D.2 GDP growth data
As noted in our empirical analysis we believe that we are using the same source of
GDP data as Schneider (2005), i.e. the World Bank’s world development index (WDI).
However, it seems that we have quite different data: Comparing our data with the GDP
growth data (from 2000) reported in Schneider (2005), we find that there are quite large
discrepancies in the numbers. In some cases the differences are alarming (consider e.g.
the reported numbers for Botswana). In table D.1 we report the difference between the
GDP growth data in Schneider (2005) and the data found in WDI for the years 1999-
2000.1 The average absolute difference is 1.26%. To check if Schneider (2005) may refer
to some other kind of data, we also compared the data with GDP per capita growth data
for 2000 (1.98% difference), GDP growth averaged over 1999-2000 (1.92%) and GDP per
capita growth averaged over 1999-2000 (2.67% average absolute difference).
1We compute the growth rate as shown in chapter 7.
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Country Schneider’s data World Bank data Absolute difference
Albania 9.15 8.96 0.19
Algeria 5.05 4.92 0.13
Argentina 1.77 1.39 0.38
Armenia 8.16 8.51 0.35
Australia 4.21 4.14 0.07
Austria 5.34 5.40 0.06
Azerbaĳan 20.37 19.1 1.27
Bangladesh 8.58 8.04 0.54
Belarus 8.30 8.66 0.36
Belgium 6.13 6.33 0.20
Benin 8.42 7.92 0.50
Bolivia 5.04 5.07 0.03
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.00 8.65 8.65
Botswana -2.06 11.66 13.72
Brazil 7.68 6.06 1.62
Bulgaria 9.30 8.97 0.33
Burkina Faso 4.66 3.82 0.84
Cameroon 8.45 6.27 2.18
Canada 6.17 6.67 0.50
Chile 8.51 7.55 0.96
China 9.92 10.27 0.35
Colombia 1.04 6.25 5.21
Costa Rica -0.37 -0.13 0.24
Cote d’Ivoire 0.77 -0.94 1.71
Croatia 5.96 5.42 0.54
Czech Republic 5.47 6.35 0.88
Denmark 6.34 6.43 0.09
Dominican Republic 9.86 10.06 0.20
Ecuador 3.98 6.22 2.24
Egypt 7.73 7.91 0.18
Ethiopia 8.01 7.64 0.37
Finland 7.91 7.15 0.76
France 5.32 6.51 1.19
Georgia 8.20 5.44 2.76
Germany 5.24 5.31 0.07
Ghana 7.03 6.88 0.15
Greece 7.18 7.24 0.06
Guatemala 6.03 5.93 0.10
Table D.1: Discrepancies in GDP growth data for 2000.
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Country Schneider’s data World Bank data Absolute difference
Honduras 6.52 7.65 1.13
Hong Kong 14.26 14.04 0.22
Hungary 7.63 7.69 0.06
India 6.35 6.57 0.22
Indonesia 6.96 6.07 0.89
Iran 7.14 7.15 0.01
Ireland 15.67 12.3 3.37
Israel 10.64 12.03 1.39
Italy 5.25 5.45 0.20
Jamaica 4.1 2.91 1.19
Japan 4.78 4.62 0.16
Jordan 4.57 2.69 1.88
Kazakhstan 16.14 15.95 0.19
Kenya 1.82 2.44 0.62
Korea 10.43 9.87 0.56
Kyrgyz Republic 7.70 7.97 0.27
Latvia 7.87 9.63 1.76
Lebanon 2.03 2.60 0.57
Lithuania 5.52 5.43 0.09
Madagascar 8.06 7.82 0.24
Malawi 4.25 3.49 0.76
Malaysia 14.61 12.87 1.74
Mali 6.86 4.98 1.88
Mexico 9.09 8.83 0.26
Moldova 1.56 4.81 3.25
Mozambique 4.89 5.09 0.20
Mongolia 3.88 3.94 0.06
Morocco 2.60 2.97 0.37
Nepal 8.62 8.29 0.33
Netherlands 5.94 5.48 0.46
New Zealand 4.86 4.71 0.15
Nicaragua 7.25 6.24 1.01
Niger 2.45 0.69 1.76
Nigeria 6.89 13.69 6.80
Norway 4.45 4.84 0.39
Pakistan 7.05 8.46 1.41
Panama 2.27 4.12 1.85
Peru 5.31 5.21 0.10
Table D.1 continued.
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Country Schneider’s data World Bank data Absolute difference
Philippines 6.28 9.43 3.15
Poland 6.32 6.75 0.43
Portugal 6.00 6.55 0.55
Romania 3.74 3.87 0.13
Russia 8.81 10.85 2.04
Saudi Arabia 8.86 8.83 0.03
Senegal 8.08 5.32 2.76
Singapore 13.76 16.00 2.24
Slovak Republic 4.90 4.54 0.36
Slovenia 7.24 6.65 0.59
South Africa 5.58 6.4 0.82
Spain 6.3 6.8 0.50
Sri Lanka 8.73 13.9 5.17
Sweden 6.17 6.39 0.22
Switzerland 5.37 4.68 0.69
Syria 7.52 3.67 3.85
Tanzania 7.00 7.59 0.59
Thailand 5.18 5.76 0.58
Tunisia 7.42 7.54 0.12
Turkey 10.05 10.02 0.03
Uganda 5.90 10.36 4.46
Ukraine 8.48 8.50 0.02
United Arab Emirates 0.00 5.80 5.80
United Kingdom 5.97 5.46 0.51
United States 7.44 4.97 2.47
Uruguay 1.24 0.64 0.60
Uzbekistan 7.86 6.78 1.08
Venezuela 5.06 5.63 0.57
Vietnam 7.93 9.22 1.29
Yemen 12.64 7.40 5.24
Zambia 4.86 5.67 0.81
Zimbabwe -5.58 -6.58 1.00
Table D.1 continued.
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